THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some Problems in Public Administration

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New York, January 1954
Introduction

1. National economic development is dependent upon a number of factors. It requires physical resources, human ingenuity, capital, political endorsement and governmental machinery that is capable of meeting the demands that such growth places upon it. But above all, its achievement depends upon an understanding of its needs and implications.

2. Within the sector of Public Administration, no aspect is as fundamental as the competence of the civil service. For without a personnel administration that is able, informed, dedicated and confident, no government can hope to embark efficiently upon a programme of large-scale development and improvement. Indeed, it would appear that successful economic growth is generally conditioned by preceding or simultaneous development of an improved civil service system. The history of many countries - large and small, industrial and agricultural, oriental and occidental - affords examples to confirm this point.

3. Obviously, an efficient civil service is only one part of the larger pattern of competent public administration - but it is surely the most urgent. It would be poor expedience and worse logic to introduce a new fiscal system or a series of public corporations if the staff responsible for their execution does not know or care how they should be administered. Moreover, a government with a civil service that is respected for its integrity and efficiency will more readily elicit public cooperation at home and abroad.

4. Even the initiation of an economic development programme, though its conception may be the work of the political leaders of the government, assisted by experts selected for the purpose, is largely dependent on the assistance of a competent civil service. The basic data concerning agriculture, industry, trade and natural resources have to be collected by central and territorial services and to be made serviceable by a statistical office. The financial implications must be evaluated in relation to the budget and the general financial situation. Taxes and tariffs may have to be revised in connection with such a programme. Plans for land settlement involve the administration of the public domain; plans for increased production parallel the development of the communication and transport services. Monetary aspects will necessitate the cooperation of the central bank and often of the customs service. And apart from their contribution to the basic data on which any economic development programme must rest, an intelligent civil service can have a considerable share in policy determination itself, particularly in estimating the feasibility of the various projects and their effect on the different sectors of the population.
5. All this implies the necessity for a civil service of undisputed ability and integrity. The ideal of a civil service which offers entirely objective advice whatever the political composition of the government, has been achieved in some west European countries. Where current economic change is itself an important factor in contemporary politics, it may not be expedient to employ as senior civil servants men known to be openly out of sympathy with political trends, but even if the field of recruitment is limited, no effort should be spared to find recruits of unquestioned quality.

6. Even so, the successful development of the civil service implies more than the selection of capable individuals for public employment. Like any other resource, it must be carefully administered, and in the development of contemporary administrative systems, several recognisable features are of especial importance. They include:

(i) The structure for personnel administration,
(ii) pay structure and policy,
(iii) position or individual classification,
(iv) recruitment and examination,
(v) human relations and morale,
(vi) employee organization and representation,
(vii) training,
(viii) devolution of authority, and
(ix) promotion, separation and pension procedures.

7. Not all of these can be separately identified in the personnel systems of every country. There is a wide range of variation, and a review of the impact of economic development upon government personnel structures must be restricted to those areas which can most usefully be analyzed.

The Structure of Personnel Administration.

8. An administrative structure defines and coordinates function and responsibility for the execution of policy. The machinery and methods employed may substantially condition the character and scope of that policy.

9. In this respect, the structure for personnel administration is of great importance. In some countries centralized personnel authority is given to a Public Service Board, a Civil Service Commission, or to some other identifiable authority at top executive level. There are various points within the governmental structure at which this office can be located; usually there is close liaison with the fiscal agency. Thus, it is possible to survey and control all aspects of personnel administration and to coordinate the activities of the principal service departments through the action of a central authority.

10. In some countries with an abundant supply of well qualified personnel and a firmly established civil service tradition, the need for such a centralization of personnel administration may not be as keenly felt as in others; but wherever the requirements of the public service exceed the
availability of trained manpower, a central direction of personnel policies is almost indispensable if the best possible use is to be made of limited resources.

11. However well-rooted good traditions may be in a particular country, it is of paramount importance that external pressures on the civil service should be reduced to a minimum. The concept of a career civil service, giving impartial yet constructive advice, is strengthened considerably in this way, and personnel policy can itself be based upon broad planning and research. A civil service which is confident regarding its own status, is more likely to be responsible and responsive to the performance of its tasks, and to produce in the higher ranges, the outstanding and experienced civil servants who are the mainstay of a vital and sustained economic policy. Moreover, administrative leadership which is backed by a responsible bureaucracy is likely to enjoy better understanding in its relations with the legislative body and with the public.

12. Generally, there is no consistent personnel policy without central planning control. Amongst those countries lacking such an authority, the Minister of Finance or the Comptroller-General is sometimes placed in charge of certain aspects of personnel administration. With such an arrangement, personnel policy often tends to be accommodated to the major functions of these ministries rather than be treated as an integral part of the state's entire administrative system. Thus some aspects of personnel administration may be overemphasized (e.g., salary), while others are neglected (e.g., training).

13. There are instances among countries at various levels of development where the parliament exercises close jurisdiction over general pay policy and at the same time allows the operating departments to make their own interpretation in such particular matters as recruitment, classification, promotion and so on. Alternatively, and fortunately infrequently, personnel policy is spelled out in such detail by parliamentary statute that a new law or amendment becomes necessary to effect even minor changes in structure or method.

14. Departmental autonomy in personnel administration provides advantages in certain situations. It makes for freedom of action, some healthy competition between departments, and gives priority to the operating officer in conducting his personnel affairs.

15. But in a country which is undergoing major economic development, a completely decentralized approach can produce chaotic results. If, say, the Ministry of Agriculture suddenly needs to expand its supply of clerks in consequence of a new land reclamation programme, the normal processes for recruitment, selection and on, may be thrown completely off balance not only for this Ministry but for other departments as well.
16. This is particularly true when professional or specialized personnel, which may in general already be in short supply, is suddenly required in comparatively large numbers for a part of the programme. If, in such a situation, the necessary measures are not taken at once to increase the numbers — special training, incentives for study, in that particular field, temporary recruitment of foreigners and so on — the entire public service may be affected or the programme itself may bog down. A centralized personnel agency is in a better position to adapt policy to such sudden exigencies than a single department.

17. The requirements, which economic development makes upon the structure for personnel administration, do not differ materially from the criteria which comprise a good personnel system in any sort of economy.

18. Where a sound personnel administration exists, an accelerated economic development may cause emergency requirements, but these can be dealt with along the well-established lines of personnel policy. They only demand temporary provisions, which will gradually become an additional element in the policy structure, without fundamentally changing that structure unless the economic system of the country itself is undergoing a fundamental change.

19. In other cases, where the personnel administration has not yet obtained a stable and effective character, it may be unavoidable to organize those parts of the establishment which are most directly needed for the economic programme along modern lines, without waiting for a complete civil service reform. It is even possible that such a reform depends on economic development more than on an understanding of its principles, and that those principles can be applied in the beginning only where economic development would obviously be impossible without their application, and at the same time provide the financial means for their implementation. Such a partial introduction of a merit system is only dangerous, if its extension to the other parts of the public service is not seen as an imperative sequel; two incompatible systems should not be allowed to continue indefinitely side by side. Here again, a central agency is probably the best guarantee against such discontinuity of the process of reform.

20. The general principles of a merit system are themselves relatively simple:

21. Firstly, there must be equity. This means not only equal pay for equal work, but also a presumption of substantially equal treatment and opportunity for all public employees regardless of their department.

22. Secondly, there must be economy. Economy, like efficiency, is often difficult to define in the context of public administration. But simply, the machinery for personnel administration must avoid duplication and needless expenditure of time and energy.
23. Thirdly, there must be incentive. This element consists of several factors including salary, security of tenure, prestige and opportunity for advancement and transfer. Any good personnel structure must also provide official channels of communication through which the employee may convey suggestions and grievances as well as response to commands. As one writer has put it: "Structure is an arrangement of the working relationships of individuals, not merely an impersonal process of putting blocks together to make buildings." Thus a recognition of the human factor is essential in the construction or evaluation of any administrative mechanism.

24. Finally, a good system must be flexible. The value of an organization can be measured by its ability to adjust to changing needs and problems. Nowhere is this more pressing than in a country undergoing economic development. An expanding economy invariably creates demand — sometimes rather suddenly — for new governmental functions and therefore new departments and bureaux, new personnel and new qualifications, and from the established staff a capacity for growth.

25. The introduction of perfection of a merit system where it does not exist or has been insufficiently elaborated raises a number of practical problems which are among the most difficult in personnel administration. If standards of recruitment and promotion are to be raised, transitory measures will be needed on behalf of the civil servants appointed under the previous rules. Old and new will have to be integrated and possibilities should be created for additional training of those who have lacked such training in the past. A revision of posts and salaries may require complicated adjustments.

26. It should be understood that even if conditions do not yet make it possible to organize the major part of the civil service as a career service of the non-political type, the merit system can and should be applied, even if the field of choice is limited by extraneous considerations.

27. In an attempt to find the best structural arrangement and methods of personnel administration to achieve these objectives in a particular country, the solution will seldom be found in the mere adoption of the techniques of some other country. They vary considerably and each is the result of long evolution and the product of particular historical and cultural conditions. Moreover, even the more advanced techniques are themselves open to considerable criticism, as personnel officers in the countries concerned would readily admit. Obviously, there is terrain where the horse may make more progress than the automobile.

28. Neither can the problem be posed as a simple choice between centralized administration of personnel and a decentralized approach. But it is probable that the answer lies in a balance between these two points of emphasis. It seems, however, that where comprehensive and profound reforms are desired, or economic development necessitates organized development of economic planning, the case for centralization under the highest authority is stronger. Where the balance should be struck, what is the best way to combine coordination with autonomy, will require a unique formula for each country through an approach that may differ from those which other nations at various stages of development have conceived before.
Pay Structure and Policy of a Civil Service

29. The pay structure of a Civil Service as a rule is arrived at by a process of evolution and each country therefore develops a structure peculiar to itself. In a country with a well developed civil service system, the pay structure tends to be complicated by a process of a gradual readjustment to changes over the years. In a less developed country it is likely to be simpler but sometimes less capable of modification. The factors which determine the evolution of civil service salaries have much in common in all countries and in making modifications or innovations one administration may borrow from another. Certain generalisations and comparisons are thus profitable and interesting.

30. The salaries offered by any civil service must bear some relation to salary scales in other employment. Every government which intends to set up an efficient administration must offer sufficient attraction to secure the right type of recruit to its service. The attraction need not necessarily by a direct monetary one; there are other considerations such as prestige, security, career opportunities and retirement pension. Long-term factors may be involved, but even so the attraction must in some degree be operative at the time of recruitment. Commencing salary is often at least as important as considerations which take effect later in the career. In countries which have not yet experienced extensive industrial or commercial development, employment in the civil service may carry greater attraction and prestige because of the absence of alternative employment of equal standing.

31. In general the salary structure, if it is to be effective in recruiting staff of the right quality for the civil service, will have to show a certain conformity to the general income structure of the country. If, at the lower level, the inevitable requirement of literacy contracts with a wide-spread analphabetism, payment at that level may have to be higher than that of the social groups to which they would belong in a country with general primary education; on the other hand, salaries in the higher brackets may be comparatively moderate in countries where the income pyramid in the private sector has a very high and narrow top, because prestige and security have an excessive importance.

32. One of the most frequent phenomena in countries going through a process of rapid development is the constant change in relative values of diplomas and grades. As literacy spreads the primary school diploma is devaluated; the same will happen to secondary and higher education, though often at a slower pace. Certain qualifications for which a sudden demand develops may become temporarily overvaluated. The educational policy in its broadest sense is a factor of great influence on personnel policies in such countries and requires imaginative planning ahead in view of the considerable time-lag between the inception of an education and training programme and its effect in an increased supply of alumni. Frequent adjustments of either salary-scales or required qualifications for government
posts are inevitable under such circumstances; the choice of the right moment and the scope of such adjustments belong to the most delicate problems in personnel policy.

33. In countries which are now for the first time feeling the impact of economic development, the problem of attracting suitable people into the public service may therefore be more than ordinarily acute. Economic development usually requires the setting up of new agencies, and in their anxiety to attract the personnel necessary for their own function, these agencies may try to outbid the civil service in the terms which they are prepared to offer. Moreover, economic development stimulates commercial activity, and growing commercial organisations become yet another competitor for the available trained personnel. From a civil service point of view the recruitment market becomes more and more difficult as the effect of new developments become more and more widespread in the activities of the country.

Salary Structure:

34. The salary structure has certain recognisable features which are common to every service. For example, the top level of pay is usually determined by the salaries of members of the government; ministers do not like the idea of being paid less than their subordinates. Moreover, since civil servants are paid from taxes, public opinion as expressed in parliament or elsewhere is a factor in the determination of their salaries. In this way, every country arrives at a reasonable expectation of reward for a lifelong career in the public service or for posts carrying greater responsibility and requiring high competence. The top level of salary in a civil service is rarely as high as that in comparable commercial employment; and in some countries it is lower than that in public corporations. Security in office against political changes in government and the prestige derived from honours conferred by the head of the state are often factors which lead senior public servants to accept somewhat lower salaries than men of equivalent standing in other walks of life.

35. A typical contrast between countries with a long history of civil service development and countries where such a development is only in its initial stage, is that in the first group the spread of social security in the private sector has followed security and retirement provisions in the civil service at a considerable distance, whereas in the second group it may happen that general social security legislation is enacted or security provisions are introduced by private companies, while the civil service is still subject to political change. It is obvious that such a situation will have a particularly adverse effect on civil service recruitment in general.

36. In the matter of recruitment the public service has to compete with other occupations and must offer either a reasonably good starting salary or some equivalent immediate compensation in security or prestige. The new entrant will look for some early recognition of his academic or professional qualifications, and in deciding upon his employment, if he has a
choice, he will take the one which seems best likely to enable him to set up house by whatever is determined by social custom as the normal age of marriage. Questions of social prestige may influence his choice, but he will undoubtedly also weigh up the more material factors.

37. Between the levels of commencement salary and top remuneration, the whole structure of the pay system has to be fitted in, and the width of the gap between these two levels materially influences intermediate salaries and the possibility of building up career prospects. The gap itself may be influenced by economic stratification and social custom: in some countries people look for a greater increase in remuneration over the whole period of their working life than in others, and in such countries the highest salary must be proportionately greater than the commencing salary.

38. In some countries, whose civil service salaries have been studied by the Technical Assistance Administration, the structure is entirely unsystematic. Each post carries a personal rate of pay, appropriate to the existing holder, and there is no system of regular increases, or increments. Other civil services have borrowed a salary structure from another country, and a familiar example of a borrowed system is the one usually known as the bareme.

39. In this type of structure each individual grade is assessed at an appropriate level in a general scheme, and so in theory every post has its correct salary in relation to that of every other. There is usually some arrangement for incremental progression, annual or otherwise, subject to satisfactory performance of duty.

40. The bareme system, which originated in France, thus applies one common pattern of salary steps to a wide variety of grades; the incremental steps are included in the general pattern. For example, a grade may be assessed with a starting salary, set at level 250, and (assuming that the salary steps are in units of 50) the official may progress with the years to levels 300, 350 and so to 400. Another grade may commence at level 350 and the individual may in time progress to say 500, following the steps of the ladder. The levels are predetermined as part of the structure and are common to all grades. With their various incremental points they overlap one another a good deal and in some services a junior of long experience may serve a senior with a somewhat lower salary.

41. The bareme has obvious advantages; it is unified and relatively simple; it ensures reasonable equality of treatment between staffs of different ministries; and it is comparatively easy to adjust to changes in the cost of living because the whole of the structure can be altered by the addition of an appropriate percentage increase.

42. On the other hand, there are difficulties in fitting into so rigid a structure new types of posts created to meet the needs of economic development. In many countries there is a marked tendency at the present time to call more and more on the services of professional experts - engineers,
doctors, economists, statisticians and so on. They tend to think of remunera-
tion in terms of the pay of comparable members of their profession, not in
terms of the civil service structure, and they do not therefore fit in easily
to the bareme.

43. The principal disadvantage of the bareme is that it cannot easily
be modified to meet demands such as these. It is within itself logical and
consistent, and exceptional posts must either arbitrarily be fitted into it
or they will destroy its symmetry. There are serious dangers in building up
exceptions; in time they undermine the principles on which the main structure
is based. Nevertheless, in a country where far-reaching changes are taking
place, the bareme structure often seems too rigid and from time to time the
advice of visiting experts is sought to suggest modifications to meet current
developments without destroying the basic pattern of the salary scheme. No
simple or perfect answer to this problem is likely to be found, because any
such structure is the product of gradual evolution; changes must be effective,
but at the same time be derived from what has gone before. In these matters
the evolutionary method is the only safe one, but the speed of evolution must
keep up with the general speed of change.

Authority for the Salary Structure:

44. Every civil service must have some basis in the legal system of the
country, for its main function, reduced to its simplest terms, is to act as
the executive agent in carrying out the expressed intentions of the budget
and law-making authority. So much for underlying theory; in practice other
considerations enter into the basic regulation of a civil service.

45. A good many countries accept, more or less as an ideal, the West-
European concept of a civil service free from political influence, but many
countries still have a long way to go along the road which leads to this
goal and often progress can be made only by direct legislative action.
Security of tenure for the individual in spite of political change, recruit-
ment free of political influence, and such like assurances of the indepen-
dence of the civil service are principles that have to be accepted by the
executive and legislature. Important amongst these guarantees is the primary
one of the pay structure itself. No civil service can give objective advice
or willing service unless its continued existence is guaranteed by regular
pay.

46. In the few countries which preserve amongst their inheritance of
tradition the stability and independence of the civil service, it is possible
that a legal guarantee is deemed superfluous; in some instances a concept of
direct loyalty to the crown takes its place and whilst preserving the right
of criticism by less direct methods, the parliament tends to avoid the burden
of direct civil service legislation. Even then, the parliament retains the
ultimate control of the budget from which the civil service is paid.

47. Countries which are in a state of transition are not so fortunate;
economic changes are accompanied by changes in political ideas, and modifi-
cations to the civil service structure need almost daily attention. Detailed
legislation is frequently unavoidable. Sometimes parliamentary sanction becomes necessary even for an individual post.

48. This procedure tends to involve the parliament in detailed work and has the constant disadvantage that revision is slow. A new post cannot be set up without the full processes of legislation and conversely a post may continue to exist and the holder be legally entitled to pay between the time when the need for it has disappeared and the passing of the necessary amending legislation. It also invites undue political influence in appointments and other personnel matters.

49. The bareme system has its advantages from the point of view of legislative control. If the parliament has approved the whole of the pay structure, alterations in pay may be made by general adjustment to meet alterations in the cost of living, and a general revision of pay approved by the parliament can be applied grade by grade throughout the structure.

Control of the numbers employed:

50. Control by the legislature is as important in determining the numbers as the pay of civil servants. The number of persons employed in the various grades in a ministry must ultimately have budget sanction. In some countries each ministry is required to lay its own proposals before the legislature; in others they may be correlated before presentation by some such authority as a Civil Service Commission or the Ministry of Finance, or ultimately by the Cabinet.

51. Control of the numbers of civil servants employed in any service is related not only to the size of departments but to the grading of individual posts. A ministry might be scrupulously economical in reducing the number of its staff to a minimum; but it might seek to pay them disproportionately high salaries. Usually the fault, if any, lies in the other direction; too many people are employed, often in the lower salary ranges. This may spring from motives irrelevant to the work; employment may be a disguised reward for political service or a form of unemployment insurance.

52. The correct staffing of a civil service department intimately affects every working member of the staff since his responsibilities, his working load and to some degree his pay, depend upon it. Therefore, some administrations have successfully attempted to interest the staff in matters of organization by direct consultation between representatives of the management and of its employees. This is clearly a matter in which experience varies between one country and another, and is influenced by the general relationship between employers and organized labour in the country concerned. It is, however, in the countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia, with a civil service entirely detached from political influences, that joint consultation in problems of civil service organization has made greatest progress.
Problems of organization present themselves in a variety of ways in different countries. Work measurement is a novelty and is difficult of application; yet in every efficient civil service there must be vigorous control both of the overall numbers and of the function allocated to each and every post. The fact that a reduction in working hours can become a disguised means of increasing the total number of staff employed, should not be overlooked. Independent inspection, by a Civil Service Commission or some such independent body, may be necessary. If each ministry is allowed to do its own inspection, there must be some effective coordination between ministries.

It is what people do, not what they are called or what they are paid, which justifies their existence as civil servants. Therefore, duties must be defined and assigned for every post, a process which has received close attention from American writers on public administration, one of whom has gone so far as to say that "Duties classification is one of the most far-reaching steps taken in the public personnel field since the inauguration of civil service laws."

In any civil service each officer must be employed on a post for which adequate justification exists in the way of work to be done. Therefore, the load must be defined; in amount it must be adequate for one person. The post itself must then be assigned an appropriate place in the pay structure in relation to other posts. Moreover, the job must be a fulltime one; some countries have been so misguided as to allow short working hours in order that individuals can secure other part-time employment. In this way salaries can be kept low and a greater number of posts made available, but the system makes for divided loyalties and is neither desirable nor efficient.

Whether the detailed procedure of drawing up a written description of each individual job, or a broader approach is better, can only be determined in the circumstances of the individual country. Detailed job descriptions tend to produce a structure lacking in elasticity and in any case it is unwise to introduce them as an immediate innovation, where the system has never before been applied. The task of going over every post in detail is overwhelming and an intermediate stage of a broad assessment of groups of posts is undoubtedly a better beginning.

Finally, it may be observed as a general experience that, when civil service morale is high and new tasks are undertaken with energy and enthusiasm, the danger of overstaffing is less great even if no elaborate system of job classification and workload control has yet been introduced. Detailed measures of control usually become urgent in case of a spasmodic expansion of the government service, or of the rank growth of routine and leisure habits in a bureaucracy.

Recruitment:

Recruitment is another problem which varies with environment. In some countries each ministry finds its own recruits; in others there is a
Civil Service Commission or Public Service Board which recruits for the whole service.

59. The main advantage of the Civil Service Commission, and the reason why most Commissions were first established, is that freedom from influence and patronage in recruitment can in this way be more readily assured. If one agency alone is responsible for recruitment, it is necessary only to ensure the integrity of that agency and to see that there are no posts outside its scope.

60. In the less developed countries a Commission, or its equivalent, is the exception rather than rule, but even where recruitment is not a centralized function, some governments have accepted the principle of competitive examination. Some common standard seems necessary to ensure that the quality of recruits is the same throughout the service, and a central recruitment agency can more readily act as a safeguard against variation in standard and against particular inducements being held out by one ministry to compete with others in securing new entrants.

61. The principle of competitive examination is important; it offers a readily acceptable and objective method of selection, but for recruits who may, in time, advance to the highest ranks in the service, some test of personal fitness also seems to be necessary. The case for psychological and so-called intelligence tests has not so far been fully proved; although these methods of selection have their ardent supporters, they are at best only a single factor in a judgment formed on several criteria. Nevertheless, academic qualifications alone are not necessarily adequate and some weight in personnel selection should presumably be given to the findings of an interview board.

62. Not only is academic qualification in itself an inadequate guide, but there are dangers in its overemphasis. Some countries, anxious to sponsor university programmes designed to secure recruits of a certain type for the public service, have promised appointment to all qualified candidates, regardless of available posts. This means that some entrants are either not fully employed or are temporarily placed in more junior duties. Experience suggests that the employment of staff with appreciably more than adequate qualifications can be as dangerous to working morale as the employment of unqualified personnel.

63. Furthermore, every civil service system should give an opportunity to outstanding employees on the lower and intermediate levels of educational preparation to qualify for the next higher group through in-service training or through specially designed courses. These entrants from below often bring valuable experience into the higher category. The possibility of such an extraordinary promotion can be an incentive for good service for the entire group and eliminates friction between the hierarchically adjoining groups in the civil service.

Training.

64. In a country which is introducing changes in its administrative organization, the need for staff training is accepted without question, but the development of a programme is not always easy, particularly where there is little or no previous experience.
65. The development of administrative training schemes has attracted the attention of the United Nations from the early years of its existence; plans have been discussed for an international administrative training centre and have been held in abeyance as premature largely in order that attention, and the necessary funds, can be devoted to the development of regional or national centres. The fellowship and scholarship programme of the United Nations also includes a number of awards for studies in public administration.

66. In studies of this character, concerned mainly with principles and techniques of general administration, progress has been made in a variety of countries. In North America public administration is an important feature of the teaching programme of a number of universities; in Western Europe, public administration is being introduced in an increasing number of university curricula, but on the other hand, certain institutions, notably the Administrative Staff College in the United Kingdom and the École Nationale d'Administration in France, have no direct association with a university; indeed at both a number of students possess no formal academic qualification. India and Pakistan both have academies for the training of their higher civil service; and new developments are in progress in Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

67. Training at a less advanced level for the day-to-day functions of operational staff necessarily attracts less attention internationally, but it is to a large degree the foundation on which the efficiency of the administrative machinery principally depends. It would be difficult to survey what is being done in every country represented by members of the Seminar, but amongst countries where the United Nations has a programme of technical assistance in public administration, Turkey may be taken as an example of what has already been achieved. The Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, has an excellent induction course for newly appointed Kaymakams (assistant provincial governors); there are police colleges at Istanbul and Ankara; training centres for the postal, telegraph and telephone department at Istanbul, and for the state railway at Eskesehir.

68. In considering training, it will perhaps be sufficient to suggest seven important principles which must be observed in the development of training schemes for the staff of the civil service, or of public enterprises, in a country which is meeting changes brought about by economic development.

69. Whatever the nature of the training scheme, it must directly related to recruitment policy. If there is an entrance examination, the educational attainment of the pupils can easily be assessed; if not, the selection must be made from applicants who have the necessary aptitude and intelligence. If recruits are not forthcoming by those standards, the training scheme must be modified accordingly. At the conclusion of the training there must be a passing-out test, with the understanding that candidates who do not satisfy the examiners should be rejected. An organized arrangement of this kind ensures that the training scheme is of practical value, particularly if it is supplemented by some kind of follow-up of the performance of recruits after a period of active work.
70. Any training programme should include arrangements for the proper training of the necessary instructional staff. If possible this should be centralized in each country, so that all the various organizations have an opportunity of deriving benefit from common experience.

71. At the inauguration of any training scheme the numbers admitted should be regulated to avoid overwhelming numbers in the early courses. There will inevitably be a large number of people anxious to take the course, but there is a danger that the quality may fall if too many students are admitted. The first few courses are necessarily experimental and the quality of the instruction should in no way be endangered.

72. Training should be intimately associated with research. Each training syllabus should be drawn up after consideration of the needs of the situation in the department concerned, and there should be adequate research to ensure that the teaching covers all the most recent developments, and looks ahead to likely developments in the future.

73. The training staff should work in close association with staff dealing with administrative analysis or organization and methods.

74. There should also be constant collaboration between training staff and those responsible for the issue of departmental instructions. Training should follow the departmental rules and regulations; in the drafting of these regulations the advice of training staff is valuable, because they are in a position to judge how suitable is the terminology used for the staff who have to interpret them to the public.

75. Finally, there should be intimate working association between training and inspectorial staffs, since the latter are in a special position to know how effective is the training programme in its results.

Devolution of Authority.

76. "Administrative discretion is the essence of the modern state," a contemporary political theorist has remarked. In less cryptic terms, it may be said that public policy can no longer be carried out effectively without the delegation of some authority from the legislative body to the administrative branch, and within the latter from senior officials to their subordinates. Such action is justified on several grounds. Since the legislature cannot anticipate or, it should be admitted, decide all problems that may arise in the fulfillment of legislative directions, considerable discretion must be lodged with the executive to exercise within the limits of legislative review. Secondly, some assignments may require technical or specialist knowledge not available to the top executive. Thirdly, the logic of work distribution and coordination requires that senior officials keep themselves free to deal only with those matters which deserve the authority and qualifications of their rank. The increasing number of daily executive decisions forces a wider distribution of authority if long delays are to be
prevented. Finally, in the civil servant's relations with the public he is working invariably within the dynamics of public opinion and social change. In his assignment, he personifies the state. If he lacks adequate discretion to make decisions appropriate to problems at his level, the state, as well as the individual official, loses the respect and cooperation of the public upon which the state's mission depends.

77. Among some of the administrative systems which the Technical Assistance Administration has surveyed, the importance of devolution is not widely understood. In one Middle Eastern country, for example, an official of Ministerial rank may place purchase orders to the value of £100,000 ($280,000) but cannot write off an obsolete or broken piece of equipment which is worth £5 ($14) or more. In some of the Latin American countries, delegation of authority rarely can be found below the rank of Bureau Chief, and there have been some instances in which even a Minister felt that he lacked adequate power to carry out the policy his department had been assigned. In a Far Eastern country, where the conception itself is unfamiliar, every devolution has to be enacted by the legislature. The example previously cited where Parliament by law may define virtually every aspect of personnel administration is another illustration of the absence of adequate devolution and the problems it raises.

78. Why has devolution not been more widely practiced? Several reasons appear to be important. One is the absence of official support, behind which lie issues of political evolution. Legislative bodies are reluctant to grant power to ministers. Officials within the administrative hierarchy are equally loath to act on responsibilities passed down from above and to delegate assignments to those below. Fearing economic insecurity and political pressures, the public employee guards his own sphere of authority carefully, trusting no one but himself. Another cause of inadequate devolution lies in the absence of proper training. Some officials do not know how to delegate; others, knowing how, are unwilling to delegate tasks in their name to untrained or unfamiliar hands. From these causes may result an administrative system where the top grade officials are so burdened with minor details that they cannot give appropriate consideration to major decisions, and the middle and lower grades do not have enough to do, or incentive to do what they are doing better.

79. How can these obstacles to effective devolution be overcome? The creation of a central authority over general personnel policy would be an important step. Thus the civil service would know to whom it is responsible and that it is protected against external pressures. Such control should not be confused with central administration of all matters pertaining to the civil service. This would violate the basic principle of effective devolution - a balance between those matters requiring top level decisions and those which may be delegated elsewhere.
The training of staff in improved techniques of organization and management is another possibility. It is obvious that assignments cannot be delegated unless there is presumption that they will be carried out properly.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that adequate devolution rests upon adequate controls. In many countries such coordinating devices already exist; in others, they are still in the early stages of development. Four categories of control can usually be identified.

That exercised by the policy-making body is the most important. It defines policy objectives and sometimes the methods for their fulfillment. It maintains constant surveillance on general administration and makes periodic investigation and audit of specialized aspects.

The body of droit administratif and the judicial system provide additional means for preventing and correcting the abuse of administrative power.

The administrative system itself is an additional check. At every step in the execution of an assignment, there is implicit the process of review, of which the most obvious is the scrutiny of the fiscal agency. The competence of the staff and its esprit de corps are also additional factors.

For devolution to territorial agents, control should in many cases be organized in the form of personal inspections rather than through reports and correspondence only.

It should be understood that some forms of devolution can leave the full responsibility with the higher authority, who exercises that responsibility by selecting a qualified subordinate to make the decisions in his name rather than by making them himself. In any training programme considerable attention should be given to the inter-relationship between responsibility and devolution in its many aspects and applications.

However, the most fundamental control is probably the least organized. The efficiency and integrity of the civil service — indeed of the government itself — is reflected in the attitudes which the public holds toward it. Public opinion may not participate in or be informed on the detailed aspects of administrative procedure, but it is ultimately the last court of review. Public opinion seldom expresses itself explicitly on this subject, but its general assent is indispensable in measuring administrative stability.
Conclusion.

88. The subject of this paper as originally stated is the impact of economic development upon personnel systems of underdeveloped countries. One cannot conclude without noting that the converse aspect is equally important, namely the impact or role of the civil service in economic development.

89. There is no presumption that a merit personnel system will guarantee economic development. But there is sufficient experience to indicate that large scale economic expansion cannot proceed efficiently without the existence of a capable and trained civil service.

90. These programmes of economic improvement are initiated on behalf of all the people and are dedicated to humanitarian objectives. That is why the State is involved. Moreover, every department of the State's administrative structure is affected by these programmes. Thus, every public employee is a participant. Therefore, the prospects of success or failure for economic development are acutely dependent upon the quality of the state's personnel. There is no question but that great resources of ingenuity and experience are available to all countries, among the individuals who comprise their civil service; the major differences are the extent to which they are developed and employed. The improvement of personnel procedures is one of the greatest single steps that the State can take in advancing upon its larger mission of raising the standards of human welfare and dignity.