The Communist Challenge to South Viet Nam

BY ROY JUMPER

July 20, 1956, marked the second anniversary of the Geneva Agreements which brought about an armistice in the conflict in the three Indo-China states of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. This date also signalled the deadline for holding the scheduled national elections intended to end the partition of Viet Nam which was divided along the 17th parallel at the Geneva Conference. The Viet Minh Communist regime, whose military might was concentrated in the Northern part of the country, agreed in 1954 to halt the hostilities. Confident of the continued support of the Southern peasantry, the Viet Minh believed that with two years of Franco-Vietnamese fumbling the South would become Communist by default. Political conditions in the South during the first year, characterized by civil strife and administrative ineffectiveness, seemed at first to bear out the Communists' assumption.1

Then in the summer of 1955 the Republican regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem, rejoicing in its civil war victory in Saigon over the forces of the Binh Xuyen Sect, picked up the Red challenge and began to fight for its political life. For the first time political leaders in the South were willing personally to denounce Ho Chi Minh, long-time leader of the fight against the French and now President of the Communist Government of North Viet Nam. "Off with the head of Ho Chi Minh," cried government organized demonstrators in the streets of Saigon, while Republican generals began to talk of a march northward to liberate their compatriots from Communist rule.

But the Republican regime has much work to do if it expects to meet and overcome the challenge of the Communists. In an effort to show strength, Ngo Dinh Diem's government unfortunately has begun to employ on occasion the methods of rule of the very system that it opposes. At the same time, it has not yet effected the social and economic reforms so necessary to counter the Communist movement. The government of South Viet Nam, despite its demonstrated ability to repress the military-religious Sects, still faces a real threat from the Communists who continue to have considerable strength among some sections of the Southern people, especially the peasantry.

When the French made their peace at Geneva, Viet Minh troops occupied a number of pockets below the

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17th parallel, and in areas where the Communists had no army their influence was strongly felt by the aggressive activities of their political leaders or "cadres" (called Can Bo). While French and National Vietnamese forces controlled the cities and big towns, the countryside, except for those areas held by the military-religious Sects, was largely under the sway of the Viet Minh. In addition, the rural districts of Tan An, Go Vap and Duc Hoa, near Saigon, provided convenient bases from which Communist agents could operate inside the city.

Following the armistice, the Viet Minh leaders ostensibly withdrew their troops from the South. Actually, however, many soldiers were left behind while young military and political recruits were sent north for training. Some of those who went north—their group is called Tap Ket—later returned disguised as refugees. Others infiltrated back through Laos and along the Mekong River. By late 1955, several old Viet Minh units (such as the 307th, 310th and 313th battalions) were reported in operation on the side of the military-religious Sects, who were then carrying on a guerrilla war against the Republican Army of Ngo Dinh Diem. Up to the present, however, Viet Minh troops have been used in the South largely for prestige purposes, giving moral and technical support to the Sects, and have not been in pursuit of immediate military victory.

Despite these military operations, Viet Minh activity in the South is primarily political, not military. In this respect the Communists are following an old Vietnamese maxim: first win the people, next the war against the Republican Army of Ngo Dinh Diem. To win the people and thereby open the supply routes, the Viet Minh Can Bo utilize two types of political weapons, leadership and terror.

The Communist revolution in the North was not based upon the proletariat but on the leader, who more often than not was an "educated" man. It was only after the Communists were in a position to educate in their own style that they could dip into the ranks of the ignorant for leader recruits. Consequently, in its present campaign to maintain peasant backing, the Viet Minh picked the peasant youth, called thanh nien nong than, to lead its fight. These youth, not the young intellectuals of the city, were chosen because they were of the peasantry and therefore understood it, and being only half-educated they served as ideal recruits for Communist manipulation.

If the Vietnamese people have a "bamboo civilization," then the nature of Communist leadership in Viet Nam can best be described by comparing it with the bamboo tree. The leader is like the bamboo roots, while his "followers" are like the mass of leafage on the plant. The foliage of the plant may be clipped with each season, but the roots remain and give forth new bamboo shoots with the coming of the rains.

The Viet Minh leader has three types of functions, direction, control and public relations. In carrying out these functions among a people long accustomed only to fear of their masters, he mixes cleverly terror with charity. By living an exemplary life, the leader wins friends and influences people around him. Unlike many of his counterparts in the southern Republican regime, he foregoes the fashionable white sharkskin suit for black calico or khaki, the French cooking for the traditional bowl of rice.

The Viet Minh leader is also ruthless, terror being an important element in his strategy. He makes use of several weapons of fear: terror of the individual and terror of the group. The terror directed against the individual comes in two forms: the "receive only" type and the "receive and do" type. When the "receive only" type is used, a person is only the recipient of the action; he contributes nothing. The result in Viet Nam has been a liberal number of public executions (beheading being not uncommon), assassinations, taking of hostages, poisoning, blackmail and threats.

When the "receive and do" type of terror is used, a person is first "convinced" by force and then required to make a personal contribution to the Communist cause. Two techniques are followed here. First, there is "improvement through self-education and confession" (chinh-huan). This measure is employed, for example, against a landlord who is forced to examine his past acts in the light of current Communist doctrine and then to declare himself guilty of belonging to the capitalist class. Afterwards he must make a public confession. A second technique is called "make yourself miserable in the eyes of the masses" (lo-kko). Here a landlord is selected for "breaking down" and then accused of having committed crimes against the peasants.

There is also violent and non-violent terror directed against the group. The violent type is usually sabotage and involves the setting off of plastic bombs and grenade tossing (both are old favorites in Saigon). The non-violent type includes the organization of "stay at home days," "no market days," and "group abstention from Republican-sponsored agricultural reform measures." During election campaigns the Viet Minh try to embarrass governmental favorites by reporting on their social status, finances and ambitions.

In the field of public relations, the Viet Minh agents make expert use of propaganda. To rally the population against the French was no great problem for the Viet Minh; to keep it united against a now inde-
pendent Republican government required a renewed effort. Therefore, in 1955 the Viet Minh opened a new master political organization, styled the Fatherland Front (*Mat Tran To Quoc*), the objectives of which are to work for national unification and to combat what is labeled American imperialism in the South. The Fatherland Front replaced the *Lien Viet* which served as a cover for the activities of the Communist Party.

In addition to making use of radio (voice and morse code) services, Viet Minh agents circulate a daily paper, the *Fight* (*Dau Tranh*). Theatrical performances—Viet Nam is a land where the rich patronize the movies and leave the traditional theater for the enjoyment of the poor—are vehicles of expression for Communist-inspired skits, sometimes even entire plays. Special songs and dances have been written to appeal to young people. In the villages, as in the slum sections of Saigon, Viet Minh agents masquerading as blind men can be heard singing such ditties as: “When one is not a member of the Party he is a lost sheep, his life is sad and dull. The Government needs the Party, the Party needs the People and all must work together to be happy.”

The Communist appeal is something more than a clever mixing of terror and propaganda. The Viet Minh enjoys tremendous prestige from its leadership in the long struggle for independence from the French. To various social groupings—peasants, intellectuals, government employees, soldiers and urban workers—the Viet Minh offers special reasons for support. The attraction of members of these groups to the Viet Minh is not only economic but also emotional and psychological.

**Communist Appeals to Peasants**

The Communist challenge in South Viet Nam represents above all an appeal to the peasants who account for about 90 percent of the population. To understand Communist strength among the peasantry requires, first, a review of the agricultural structure of the country and, second, an analysis of the underdeveloped character of rural administration.

Three categories of peasants may be distinguished. First, there are the farm laborers who possess no more than the physical energy that supports them. Tenants have little more: they may own a few tools, sometimes even a buffalo for plowing. A third type is the small owner, who, though he may own a couple of acres, considers himself virtually landless. Quite probably he has a family of eight to feed and must hire himself out for field work at about ten cents a day (at the open exchange rate). His meager existence is made worse by the widespread practice of selling in advance—if for no other reason than to provide resources for much-loved gambling games—his rice crop at about half its value.

Still another peasant type calls for attention: the workers on the rubber plantations. Shortly after World War I the rubber plantations began large-scale operations in the sparsely settled areas of the South, much of the labor was recruited in the overcrowded North, often by force and trickery. Mistreatment of these workers was considered an injustice by the Vietnamese who sometimes say that beneath every sap cup on a rubber tree lies the grave of a coolie. Apart from abuse at the hands of the owners, the work itself is a grueling one for the rice cultivator who is accustomed to long siestas and almost complete rest during the long rainy season. Though working conditions on the plantations improved as independence approached, the treatment received would still be considered as peonage in the United States.

To describe the peasant gives only part of the picture. His politics can best be understood when he is considered beside his agrarian adversary, the landlord. Landlordism is a key characteristic of the agricultural picture in Southern Viet Nam. Unlike those in Northern and Central Viet Nam, many holdings in the South are especially large. The great majority of the Southern peasants are in fact landless, and about 45 percent of the holdings are over 125 acres. This restriction of land ownership is simple to explain. Fields in the Southern provinces are new in comparison with those in the North and Center: much of the land was cleared out of the jungle and swamps by French colonial enterprise and distributed to the favored few, both Vietnamese and French. The depression of the 1930's, along with prevailing usury practices, narrowed the circle of owners. In many areas absentee ownership is the rule rather than the exception. Especially since the beginning of strife dating from the outbreak of World War II, owners have preferred the safety of Saigon or Paris and, when that was impossible, lived in the provincial towns under the protection of the army.

What brought landlordism into the political arena was the long absence of the owners, during which the tenants cultivated the land, received titles of ownership from the shadow Viet Minh government and, in some cases, actually began to pay their taxes to the Communist treasury. Since the Geneva armistice, the landlords have tried to re-establish control over the land. They have the legal backing of the Republican government which does not recognize the Viet Minh titles. The
landlords do not want reform—the very word imparts the notion of taking something away from them—and want to return to the prewar custom by which they alone decided the amount of the rent.

Equally important as grist for the Communist mill is the underdeveloped character of rural administration in the Southern zone. The Republican regime has inherited a colonial bureaucratic structure that began at the top in Saigon and ended at the district level of administration. Even before the French conquest there was an absence of state authority in the village; the power of the Emperor stopped at its surrounding bamboo hedge. Village councils were selected by co-option on the basis of age, education and property. The Emperor, like the French later, was interested in the villages mainly for the taxes collected there. When the rebellion against the French began, the village was a natural institution for Viet Minh subversion. In many areas the only real government on the local level was the Viet Minh committee in the village.

Another factor behind the slow pace of reform measures is the negative attitude of public officials. Many of the officials, even members of President Diem's cabinet, are themselves large landowners. At best district officials make only a faint-hearted attempt to put land reform decrees into effect. The peasants in turn have little regard for the district administrators who have long been considered as tax collectors and not servants of the people, as "yes men" of the French and not Vietnamese patriots.

Republican reform measures have therefore been limited ones providing for rent reduction and small loans and have fallen short of meeting peasant desires for land. The reforms were worked out by United States aid experts (most of whom unfortunately had little particular knowledge about Viet Nam) and then urged upon unsympathetic officials. Projects to clear swamp land in Cao San, yet to be completed, are designed to provide homesteads for some of the refugees from the North, who intensify (but are not a part of) the basic agricultural problem in the South—a greater distribution of land.

The principal measure of the land reform program provided for rentals by written contract at a rate of from fifteen to twenty-five percent of the major crop, with owners of the poorer land being compensated at the former rate. The tenants, however, are not concerned primarily with the size of the rent but rather with ownership of the fields they work, irrigation and fertilizer. The landowners, on the other hand, are interested in having the government compel the tenants to respect the rent contracts and open a National Bank of Agriculture to extend farm loans. Delegates to the National Landowners Congress in Saigon complained in July 1956 that a number of landowners had been murdered by ungovernable tenants and asked for police protection in rural areas.

At the same time that the Republican regime has failed to take sufficiently vigorous action to reform the agricultural system, it has turned to military and political measures in order to maintain control over the peasantry. Special armed guards, the Dan Ve Doan and the Bao An Doan, and civil propaganda teams have been sent into the villages. The armed guards are organized into small units and scattered across the rural districts. They, along with the Republican Army, have been ordered to "suppress" Communist elements in the villages. Yet a military chief of province with 9,000 soldiers, in addition to the police and armed guards, claims that he still does not have effective control over his territory.

The civil propaganda teams, called Cong Dan Vu, are manned by young, anti-Communist militants. That some of their number have been assassinated is evidence of their effectiveness. Their work is hampered, however, by the fact that most of them are refugees and are in fact strangers to the local population. Working under a Commissioner of Civic Action in Saigon, their operations have come into conflict with the work of the district officials who resent intrusion into what is considered their domain.

In December 1955, the Diem government decreed the "five family control law." The decree is the handbook of the Secretary of Information, Tran Chanh Thanh, and represents little more than a copy of the system of collective control used by the Communist regime in North Viet Nam. A similar system was used centuries earlier in China. According to the law, village inhabitants are to be organized into groups of five families with the chiefs of the five families making up a cell directorate. Every member of the cell is assigned a specific function: security, health, taxes, business and education. One cell watches over the activities of another cell and reports on it to the village security unit. According to the law, not only are Communists and Communist sympathizers to be reported but also "lazy people, thieves and pirates." Within the

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5 Ordoinance No. 2, Cong Bao Viet Nam Cong Hoa, (Official Journal of Viet Nam), January 8, 1955.

6 The author witnessed in December 1955, some of the pioneer efforts to put this law into effect. Documents related to the law have been assembled in Viet Nam Cong Hoa, Du An Cong Tac 6 Thang Cua, Saigon, 1955 (mimeographed).

FAR EASTERN SURVEY
family unit the chief has a long list of "state duties." To the cell directorate he is accountable for the acts of members of his family. He must report any visitors who come to his home and, as well, any "destructive activity" of his neighbors—meaning, anyone who works against the interests of the government. The "five family control law" is to be introduced gradually in all villages, beginning with several districts near Saigon.

Another area where the Communists work effectively is among the intellectuals and students. The Vietnamese intellectual is a natural joiner. He affiliates himself with a number of organizations which serve as social outlets and make possible the expression of notions long suppressed by the force of family and colonial institutions. The vulnerability of the intellectual to pro-Communist organizations may be illustrated by a review of the activities of two associations that mushroomed in Saigon in 1955 and by a glance at the political dissension among university students. First there was the case of the "Committee for the Defense of the Peace" which propagated for unity with the North and for elections for all of Viet Nam in July 1956. The Republican government promptly labeled it a Communist-front organization and jailed its leaders. The list of those arrested included many prominent Saigon intellectuals—doctors, lawyers, government officials, engineers, professors and theatrical people. After the arrests, a petition signed by some 150 intellectuals, including the one-time Premier, General Nguyen Van Xuan, protested against the government's action. General Xuan then feigned illness until he could arrange an escape, not to Hanoi but to Paris.

Another organization was the "Committee to Safeguard the Life and Property of the People." It came into existence in 1955 during the brief civil war in Saigon. The Committee maintained that it was providing relief to the victims of the fighting, but the Republican government arrested its leaders and charged them with being Communist agents who, acting under the cloak of a relief committee, were spreading "false rumors against the government." One of the men arrested—a rich pharmacist who later confided to friends that he bought his way out of prison—claimed that the authorities moved against his organization because it, not the government, was doing effective relief work and the government was jealous. It is quite likely that there were Communist agents in this association, as well as in every other association in Saigon. But there were non-Communists in it too, including students who donated their labor to rebuild homes.

The significant point is that organizations with noble

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7 The author had two or more conversations during the period December 1954-March 1956 with approximately 100 students, teachers and professors.

8 After the first convention to elect officers broke up in dispute, Southern students as a rule boycotted the second meeting.

9 The author talked with some 75 soldiers of the Republican Army, including both enlisted men and members of the officer corps.

10 Following the Binh Xuyen Sect Army attack upon the headquarters of the Republican Army in Saigon on March 29, 1955, senior officers of the Republican Army met and announced their full support for President Diem.
Military and political alignments in Viet Nam are, at best, temporary ones. In the past decade, the political winds have shifted many times. A given locality may have seen the troops of many sides—French, Japanese, British, Chinese, Viet Minh, Sect, Bao Dai and Diem. A military leader will seek the strongest side. When he changes from one side to the other it is called “rallying.” It is done amidst much fanfare and speechmaking about the “just cause.” The Vietnamese do not consider it unusual, nor do they mistake it for patriotism.

The Communists, employing a propaganda operation called Dan Van Chinh Van, also make an appeal to urban workers and low rank government employees. Their low pay and poor living conditions, in striking contrast to those of Saigon’s rich, provide a special opportunity for Viet Minh exploitation. Slum quarters in Saigon, such as Khanh Hoi and Vinh Hoi, are still without water and electricity. The extent of Viet Minh penetration of these groups is unknown, but on a number of occasions Communist agents have been arrested among members of labor organizations and the civil service.

The refugees from North Viet Nam are another group subject to the Communist appeal. They began to move South shortly after the signing of the Geneva armistice agreement. The French Army, by virtue of its occupation of the Northern delta country and the Haiphong port area, was in a position to arrange an evacuation program. And by the time that the port was finally handed over to the Communists in the spring of 1955, some 800,000 had taken advantage of French and United States’ shipping facilities to withdraw to the South.

The refugee exodus has generally been considered as representing a rejection of Communist rule. However, Vietnamese soldiers and their dependents who moved on the orders of the French high command actually accounted for about 200,000 of the refugees. An even larger bloc were poor and ignorant peasants, many of whom came from the two provinces of Phat Diem and Bui Chu where two Catholic bishops, Le Huu Tu and Pham Ngoc Chi, were virtual rulers. The desire for religious freedom was certainly an important factor behind the exodus, but another motivating force was the propaganda campaign conducted by French, Republican Vietnamese and Catholic authorities to induce the peasants to abandon their villages. In the provinces heavily populated by Catholics the priests were the real village leaders, and once the Church had decided to withdraw it was not difficult to sway the congregations. The peasants were promised “free” land and told that “God” had moved South. They were warned that the United States would drop the atomic bomb in North Viet Nam as it did in Japan during World War II. Those who had relatives among the evacuating soldiers were advised that reprisals by the Communists would follow. That the Communists did oppose the exodus and on a number of occasions resorted to force and violence to prevent departures is well known.

More for the intellectuals and property owners than for the peasants, who constituted the great majority of the refugees, the flight South represented a voluntary and a personal decision to reject Communism. Once the French Army was routed at Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh were no longer dependent upon so-called “bourgeois elements” who had cooperated in the struggle for independence and, consequently, began to suppress them. It is difficult to find a refugee student in Saigon who can not relate a tragic story of the execution of some member of his family, often a father or a brother. These refugees whose families have been broken by Viet Minh atrocities are imbued with deep feelings against the Communists. It was the refugee students who on July 20, 1955, sparked the Saigon riots that resulted in the sacking of the Majestic and Gallieni Hotels. For many of the refugee students, revenge against the Communists has become their first preoccupation in life.

The refugee group has been, politically, both a strength and a weakness for the Southern government. During the critical months of fighting with the military-religious Sects, the refugees were a source of solid support for President Diem. In the battle of Saigon the role of the refugee Nung troops was especially important. Refugee intellectuals made themselves available to fill government posts at a time when many Southerners were hesitant to work for the Diem regime. Before Diem came to power, Nationalist governments dominated by the French lacked any show of popular support. The backing of the refugees helped the Diem regime to achieve an identity of its own, free from both French and Communist control.

The refugees also created political problems for the Southern government. Their reception by the Southern people was sometimes far from cordial. The apathy, sometimes outright hostility, of the Southerners reflects

11 The author interviewed leaders in the Union of Vietnamese Christian Workers, the Union of Vietnamese Socialist Workers and the Saigon Dockers Union.

12 See, for example, the recent book by Thomas A. Dooley, Deliver Us From Evil, New York, 1956.

13 There was substantial agreement among the refugee students that resort to violence was proper when in pursuit of a "just cause."

14 In the National Assembly the refugees were allotted twelve out of a total of 123 seats, giving one representative to each of the twelve large camps. Viet Nam Press (the official government news agency) January 24, 1956.
of many of the officials concerned. The Northerners look more like the Chinese than do the Southern people who are, as a rule, darker and more akin to Indonesians and Cambodians. There is also a difference in dress, cooking and medicine. In language there are differences of tone, vocabulary and accent. The Northerners are outwardly more ambitious than the Southerners who harbor the fear that the economy and the government will eventually fall into the hands of the Northerners. Sheer survival in the over-crowded North necessitates hard labor, while in the South the peasant is sometimes considered by his Northern compatriots to be rather lazy. Already in Saigon markets, the stalls run by Northerners outsell those of the Southerners, and even in the dance halls refugee "taxi girls" easily outdo their Southern competitors.

At the outset family and village groups were kept intact and located in camps in the various provinces. Soon, however, many of the refugees began to drift back toward Saigon, and by early 1956 the number in the suburban province of Gia Dinh had swelled to more than 250,000, all seeking benefit from the prosperity and the security of the metropolis. Strangers in the South, the refugees are both restless and suspicious. Their morale is geared to government handouts and reaches its peak with each dole, only to fall quickly thereafter. They are the constant prey to the propaganda of Communist agents planted in their midst.

Particular conditions related to the administration of the refugee settlement and resettlement programs have the effect of reducing the group’s potency as an anti-Communist force. Some camp sites were selected in haste and poorly planned. In some provinces refugees were brought in without prior notice being given to local officials. In others, twice as many refugees as had been planned for were settled. Most of the camps were located in the poorest of land, ruling out in advance self-support.

Division of control in the administration of the refugee program also contributed to the poor results. Civil officials, the Catholic clergy, the Republican Army and even the military-religious Sects, particularly the Cao Dai, have all participated in the operation. Most of the camps continue to be run by priests who are preoccupied with keeping the refugees as a unit and resist efforts to integrate them into the Southern community. Graft has appeared both in the central offices in Saigon and in the camps. A review of the Saigon press for the year 1955 reveals some 100 cases of known embezzlement of refugee funds. Nevertheless, to point out some of the shortcomings of the settlement program is neither to deny nor to belittle the hard work and earnestness of many of the officials concerned.

Resettlement of the refugees in permanent units has only recently begun. The first project, calling for the eventual resettlement of about 100,000 refugees at Cai San in southwest Viet Nam provides an opportunity to improve the material well-being of some of the refugees. By August 1956, about 40,000 were transplanted to this area where the government is restoring rice lands abandoned during the war years. Each refugee family is allotted three hectares of land for rice cultivation and enough space for a small house and garden. Ownership of the land, according to present governmental rules, is being reserved to the prewar landowners who expect to benefit from rents collected from the refugees. The Cai San project is under the direction of Nguyen Van Thoi, now Secretary of the Department of Agricultural Reform and formerly a land office official during the final years of French control.

No Visible Enemy

One difficulty for the Diem regime in winning popular support is that it has not produced a "visible enemy" that the people hate. The Viet Minh revolution in Viet Nam was in essence a negative revolution—bringing together a people lacking many homogeneous qualities against a common enemy, the French. With the passing of the French the identification of that enemy is no longer clear. The absence of a political scapegoat presents a real problem for both regimes, Republican and Viet Minh. In place of the French, the Viet Minh has now turned its propaganda guns on the United States. But the fact that the "American enemy" is seldom seen (except in Saigon) limits, for the time being, the effectiveness of the new appeal.

The Republican regime in the South now tries to make the Communists the "new enemy." But the people have not yet experienced the brutality of Communist rule and remember the Viet Minh largely for its fight against the French. The Republican regime has in some respects adopted the methods of government used by its Communist neighbor in the North, these methods involving both a program of political education and reprisals against people accused of being Communist. The political education program includes regular classes and occasional mass meetings called to denounce the Communists. Public service employees, school teachers and students are required to attend. Leaders for the program were trained at a special propaganda school organized in Saigon in August 1955. In addition, public service employees have been grouped into political cells. Within an office, each employee is...
assigned a certain number of associates to watch over.

And like the Communists, the Republican regime resorts to a kind of “brain washing.” At mass meetings Communists are ferreted out to be publicly “unmasked.” They are given the choice of either confessing or facing denunciation by the assembled group. Victims are then sent to one of several camps for “re-education,” one of these, Quan Tre, being about twelve miles from Saigon.

Not only Communists but also captured members of the Sects are sent there for about three months of training. At the end of the training period those who are willing to repent are issued special identification cards and permitted to return to their homes.

Severe repression of Communists is also reported by villagers in some Southern areas. Civil justice, long discredited for its identification with French interests, has given way to rule by the military. In the absence of legal sanctions, measures intended to be used against Communists are employed to oppress members of nationalist political parties who dare oppose the Diem regime. In January 1956, President Diem decreed internment in “concentration camps” for any person whose activities were harmful to the “Government or the Army.”

The Viet Minh agents have lain low during the past two years in South Viet Nam. They waited expecting to win the South through the expected all-Viet Nam elections. If the elections are not held (and in view of recent Anglo-Soviet talks in London it appears that they will not), the Viet Minh may decide to resort to military force to settle the issue. During the armistice period the Viet Minh has built up an army of 30 divisions. According to current estimates, it is now in the act of regrouping its forces into 25 “heavy” divisions, with more men and more weapons in each division. The Republican Army has some sixteen divisions and lacks combat experience. Officials in Saigon say they must have military support from the United States in case hostilities occur.

Should its big brothers in Moscow and Peking not permit a military solution, the Viet Minh will no doubt increase its efforts to infiltrate and subvert South Viet Nam, in the hope that it would later collapse from within. The Communists can be expected to create, and aggravate, conflicts between the people—refugees versus Southerners, soldiers versus officers, district versus national officials, Buddhists versus Catholics and, most important of all peasants versus landlords. If the Republican regime is to stand against the Communist challenge it must do more to meet peasant demands for land. For the population as a whole, it must provide greater security without terror or abuse. The peasant in Viet Nam treasures the sanctity of his home equally as much as the farmer in Iowa. Force, in the long run, is no substitute for good government, whether the government be Communist or non-Communist.

Japan Between Two Worlds

BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE today find themselves forced to chart a course between two opposing ideologies, neither of them indigenous to Japan. These ideologies—democracy and communism—are the roots of foreign policy in the United States and the Soviet Union. Whether or not they can find a basis for co-existence in peace is the supreme question in contemporary international relations. If they cannot, it must be expected that China will throw her major force on the side of the U.S.S.R. Japan lies at the doorstep of overwhelming power at a time when she has barely begun to rearm and to regain her industrial strength. That fact, in the minds of the Japanese, counsels harmony with the Communist states. On the other hand Japan needs capital and trade and the raw materials of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and Southeast Asia. It is out of these considerations that the so-called neutralism of Japan has developed.

As applied to a national attitude in time of peace this term is metaphorical rather than technically accurate. “Neutrality” is the position of a country which is nonpartisan in time of war. Historically a weak state often has played one strong power or alliance against another, in that way maintaining its independence. The Japanese are not by nature pacifist, although they vented their belligerency in feudal rather than foreign wars for many centuries. Today they prefer to be nonpartisan because they have tasted the bitter tea of defeat and occupation. To suppose that this means that they are friendly to communism or indifferent to democracy is to misread the implications of their attitude. They want an opportunity to rebuild, to discover new means of survival, to find themselves.

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independence."

It is apparent from recent utterances of Japanese

political leaders that, while they wish to cooperate
closely with the United States, they prefer to do so
from a position of complete independence. Obviously
they do not occupy that position at present and will
not do so during the life of the existing Mutual
Security Treaty and its accompanying Administrative
Agreement. Prime Minister Hatoyama, who heads the
majority Liberal-Democratic Party, declared nearly two
years ago that “national pride does not allow the in-
definite continuation of a situation in which national
defense is mainly dependent upon foreign military
forces.” The platform of his party, announced on Janu-
ary 1, 1956, called for development of self-defense "so
as to prepare for the eventual withdrawal of foreign
troops stationed in this country." Shortly before this
announcement the strong, labor-backed Socialist Party
asserted in its platform that "Japan, since her defeat,
have been seriously limited and controlled by a foreign
power and is virtually in a state where she has lost
her real independence." All of these statements are
moderately phrased and hardly express the degree of
disagreement with American policies which is felt by
many Japanese. As seen by Arata Sugihara, a recog-
nized expert on Far Eastern questions, “cooperation
between the two nations should constitute the mainstay
of Japan’s foreign policy but without any semi-occupa-
tional coloring.” American consciousness of the ab-
sence of any thought of limiting the independence of
Japan should not lead us to discount Japanese inter-
pretations of our relationship to their country. It will
hardly be denied that this relationship is of our choos-
ing. If the Japanese do not regard it as protective to

Until October 1956 the technical state of war between
Japan and the Soviet Union had continued, in view of
the latter's failure to sign the peace treaty of San
Francisco. Both states desired to resume diplomatic
relations and they had been discussing possible bases
of agreement at intervals since June 1955. Speaking in
the Diet on April 25, 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama
said: “The Government, as has been stated frequently,
hopes to terminate speedily the state of war and re-
store normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. The
Government also intends to make efforts to improve
the trade relations between Japan and Communist
China. I should like to make clear again one particular
point on this occasion. That is, the normalization of
diplomatic relations with Communist countries is one
thing and the acceptance of communism is another.
We are firmly resolved to adhere to our attitude of
anti-communism and to adopt every available means
in defense of the cause of democracy.” He continued:
“Meanwhile it is an undeniable fact that, however
strongly opposed we may be to the communist ideology,
there now exist in the world certain powers which are
adherents of communism. In dealing with such powers
it would be advisable to respect each other's sovereignty
and thereby to open normal diplomatic or economic rela-
tions to mutual advantage without propagandizing or
trying to impose one’s ideology on the other. I am
firmly convinced that this very course should be adopted
also as a means of forestalling another world war, the
possibility of which is now filling all the peoples of the
world with terror.” On February 27 of the same year
the two wings of the Socialist Party issued a joint state-
ment of similar tenor. It called for the “issuance of
a joint statement declaring the termination of a state
of war between Japan on one side and Communist
China and Soviet Russia on the other, thereby to con-
clude a peace treaty, to restore normal diplomatic rela-
tions, and to promote greater trade with the afore-
mentioned nations.”

Although Russia initiated an exchange of notes on
January 25, 1955, indicating her readiness to negotiate
in Tokyo or Moscow, and subsequently appeared to
acquiesce in Japan’s preference for New York, the two
governments ultimately agreed upon London as the
site for talks, which began on June 1, 1955. Matsumoto
Shunichi represented Japan and Jacob Malik, Russia.
Until March 1956 the two men sought to reach agreement on points deemed to be obstacles to the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. The principal issues arose from the diplomatic and military consequences of World War II. They involved the repatriation of Japanese held as war prisoners by Russia, Japanese claims to South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (all of which were Japanese before the war but are now occupied by the U.S.S.R.), and Japan's desire to resume fishing rights in Soviet-controlled waters. Also of great importance to Japan was the vote of Russia in support of her admission to the United Nations. When the talks began, Japan contended that some 1,450 of her citizens were known to be alive under Soviet detention and that some 19,700 others had not been reported upon.

Japan's claim to South Sakhalin antedates her treaty of 1855 with that country. However, in 1875 she agreed by treaty to surrender that claim in return for Russia's recognition of her title to the entire Kurile chain composed of thirty islands which extend 800 miles northeastward from Hokkaido, the most northerly of the four main islands of Japan. In this treaty Russia also conceded very valuable fishing rights in the waters about Sakhalin and Kamchatka and in the Sea of Okhotsk. By defeating Russia, Japan regained South Sakhalin in 1905. Thus it may hardly be said that Japan obtained these territories by "force and greed," unless international law and practice of the right of acquisition by conquest be held to have applied only to Western imperialist expansion. As for the Habomai group of islets and the island of Shikotan, Japan has held them to be not units of the Kuriles but appurtenant to Hokkaido. During the London talks Mr. Malik agreed to turn these islands over to Japan.

Most valuable of the Kuriles to Japan were Etorofu and Kunashiri, to which the Russians had made no claim prior to the Yalta agreement. Whether or not the American and British signatories of that agreement intended to include these islands must be questioned in the light of recent American moves which, according to Secretary of State Dulles, were intended to bolster Japan's determination to regain them. Since the Soviet Union occupied the entire Kurile chain, as well as South Sakhalin, and has maintained an adamant attitude on her right to do so, there can be little likelihood that she will return them. They are so located as to offer excellent air bases close to Siberia. It is apparent that Japan's interest in regaining these islands runs counter to her desire for close cooperation with the United States. But it is unlikely that, under any circumstances short of military defeat, Russia would evacuate the Kuriles.

Following the interruption of the London conversa-

tions in March 1956, Premier Hatoyama sent his close friend, Mr. Kono Ichiro (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) to Moscow. He returned in May with a temporary fisheries agreement considerably less generous than the prewar arrangement and with the promise that the agreement would be made permanent only upon the resumption of diplomatic relations. To the Japanese this meant the exchange of part of their limited territory for fish. In July they sent Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to Moscow to try again for better terms. He sought to reach a compromise under which his government would be content with return of Etorofu and Kunashiri leaving the future of the northern Kuriles and South Sakhalin to international adjudication. In April Japan had given official status to Sergei Tikhvinsky, newly appointed head of the Soviet mission set up in Tokyo during the Occupation and permitted to remain on an unofficial basis after the Occupation ended in 1952. This move had no effect upon the Russian policy of seizing Japanese fishing boats and arresting their crews. Twenty-seven boats were captured in April, obviously with the intent to point up the advantage of a fisheries agreement. The ignominious position of Japan and the pressure upon her fishing industry may incidentally be noted in the figures of fishing boats seized on portions of the high seas forcibly controlled by Russia, China, and South Korea since 1947: a total of 830 vessels. At Moscow Shigemitsu reminded the Soviet negotiator, Dmitri Shepilov, that Matsumoto and Malik had drafted a tentative agreement on all matters but the territorial issue and trade. He presented a new draft, omitting trade and fisheries clauses, which were to be left to separate agreements. His principal effort was devoted to the argument that Etorofu and Kunashiri are "Japan's inherent territory" and were not included in the Kuriles, which, he acknowledged, Japan had given up to the Allied Powers, along with South Sakhalin, in the peace treaty of San Francisco. Although the U.S.S.R. had failed to sign the treaty, Shigemitsu stated that his government would "have no objection to confirming this stipulation . . . to the Soviet Union if Japan's position is recognized relative to the two islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri." He reminded Shepilov that the Soviets had adhered to the Atlantic Charter, thereby repudiating territorial aggrandizement. He argued also that the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, by which Russia was bound, applied only to territory which Japan had "seized" from other states, not to "inherent territory." Mr. Shigemitsu sought to impress upon the Russians his government's desire to have relations normalized on a permanent basis with the full assent of his countrymen. He refused to accept the Yalta agreement as binding upon Japan, which was not a signatory.

Shigemitsu's valiant stand made no visible impres-
sion upon the Russian negotiators. He returned to
Tokyo empty-handed, to find that Japan had suffered
another Soviet rebuff. To the proposal that Japan
should be admitted to the United Nations, made by
Australia and seconded by the United States, Great
Britain, France and other states, the Soviet representa-
tive (Georgi Saksin) objected, stating that his govern-
ment continued to insist upon the admission of Outer
Mongolia along with Japan. Despite these hard facts,
Premier Hatoyama persisted in his policy of seeking to
establish peace and normal relations with the U.S.S.R.
Since the Socialists, who had urged this policy, as well
as his own party (the Liberal-Democrats) regarded the
Soviet attitude as unjust and unjustified, he had great
difficulty in overcoming the fear that resumption of
relations without prior concessions by Russia would
seal the fate of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Although handi-
capped by lameness induced by a stroke four years ago,
Hatoyama decided to go to Moscow, taking Mr. Kono
with him. His party refused unanimous approval of
this decision but the cabinet accepted it, as did the
Socialists after heated debate. In order to assure success
he sent a note to Premier Bulganin outlining a basis
of agreement. He asked only that the two governments
issue a joint declaration terminating the state of war,
that they exchange ambassadors, and that Russia release
the remaining war prisoners, renew the interim fishing
agreement, and agree to support Japan's admission to
the United Nations. This procedure was modeled
upon the "Adenauer formula" for restoration of relations
between West Germany and the Soviets. On Sep-
rtember 28 announcement of Bulganin's acceptance of
Hatoyama's five-point proposal was made by special
envoy Matsumoto in Moscow. Buoyed up by this report
the ailing Premier flew to Moscow on October 7 via
Zurich and Stockholm. Thousands of supporters of his
mission cheered him at the Tokyo airport while several
hundred young rightists passed out pamphlets attack-
ing the trip as a leap in the dark.

Russo-Japanese Declaration

On October 19 at Moscow Bulganin and Hatoyama
signed a joint declaration which embodied the follow-
ing terms: (1) the state of war ends on the day the
present declaration enters into force; (2) diplomatic
and consular relations are re-established; (3) relations
will be guided by the principles of the United Nations
Charter; (4) the USSR will support Japan's admission
to the United Nations; (5) all Japanese prisoners will
be repatriated and the U.S.S.R. will investigate as to
the fate of other Japanese believed by Japan to be in
the U.S.S.R.; (6) the U.S.S.R. renounces all reparations
claims and both governments renounce all claims for
war damages originated since August 9, 1945; (7) talks
looking toward a trade and navigation agreement will
be begun as soon as possible; (8) the fishing convention
and the agreement for cooperation in rescue at sea,
both signed at Moscow on May 14, 1956, will enter
into force with this declaration; (9) the two countries
will cooperate in measures to conserve fish and other
marine resources; (10) the U.S.S.R. agrees to hand
over to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan
after the conclusion of a treaty of peace; (11) negotia-
tions for a peace treaty will be continued after
diplomatic relations have been established; (12) this
declaration is subject to ratification.

In order to provide for the period prior to entrance
into a full-fledged trade agreement, the two parties
also signed, on October 19, a trade protocol in which
they granted one another most favored nation treatment
and agreed to exert every effort toward the develop-
ment of trade between them. The protocol, like the declara-
tion, is subject to ratification.

While ratification of both documents was predictable
in view of Hatoyama's strength in the Liberal-Dem-
ocratic Party, the Socialists' desire for normal relations,
and popular sentiment, it is apparent that the territorial
issue will continue to complicate Japan's relations with
both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Japan carries on formally correct diplomatic relations
with the National Government of China in Formosa,
but all her political parties are agreed upon the neces-
sity of normalizing relations with mainland China. This
fact has been made crystal clear in their statements of
policy and in public addresses of Hatoyama and Shige-
mitsu. For parlors to this end have been conducted be-
tween Tokyo's and Peking's representatives in London.
In the face of American opposition to the recognition
of Peking, the Japanese have not solved the problem of
how to insure that divergence from American policy
will not disrupt cooperation with this country. But it
may be anticipated that, with resumption of regular
relations with the Soviet Union, Tokyo will press more
insistently for an acceptable arrangement with Com-
munist China. There appear to be no insuperable ob-
tacles to successful negotiations. Japan will ask for
repatriation of citizens still held as war prisoners and
for settlement of claims arising out of seizure of fishing
vessels. But no territorial issues are presently in view
between Peking and Tokyo. Neither the Nationalists nor
the Communists have resurrected China's historical
claim to the Ryukyu Islands.

For the foreseeable future the control of Formosa is
determined by the guarantee of the United States to
defend it, given in the mutual defense treaty with Na-

N O V E M B E R  1 9 5 6  1 7 1
not been settled. Although Japan renounced title in the San Francisco treaty, and the Cairo Declaration promised their return to "China," the rival claims of the Nationalist and Communist governments of China have not been resolved. In view of Japan's interpretation of her rights to Kunashiri and Etorofu, it may be surmised that under favorable conditions she would seek the return of Formosa as "inherent territory." Such conditions are conceivable but not predictable at this time. There is no present indication that either Japan or Communist China would permit the Formosan issue to interfere with establishment of peace and diplomatic relations.

Japan's primary interest in establishing normal relations with mainland China, aside from her desire to be regarded as nonpartisan between the parties in the "cold war," is trade. Mr. Ayukawa Gisuke (President of the Teikoku Oil Company and a member of the House of Councillors in the Diet) maintained in the periodical Chuo Koron in March 1955 that:

... the future development of Japan's economy is closely connected with that of India and of the People's Republic of China. As far as Japan's overseas supply of iron ore, limestone, coal, manganese and other raw materials is concerned, both India and China (mainland) are important supplier countries and these countries depend reciprocally upon Japan for various finished manufactures. In fact, the People's Republic of China, as both customer and supplier, is possibly more important to Japan than to Great Britain. The current economic requirements calling for the opening of trade between Japan and the People's Republic of China must be closely examined and justly evaluated before such trade relations between the two countries are subjected to severe, definitely biased criticisms.

This comment is typical of the pressure being exerted in Japan by business and industry upon the government. The growth of heavy industry during World War II increased the importance of access to Chinese iron and coal and to Chinese markets. While these are available elsewhere, particularly in the United States and Southeast Asia, transportation costs are greater and Japan's ability to compete with American products of heavy industry is less than in dealings with China. Japan must buy if she is to sell. There is the additional factor of her superiority to other states of Asia in technical knowledge, very little of which is exportable to the West while there is a considerable market for it in Asia. This factor is not only of consequence in itself; it is also of complementary value for the sale of machinery.

Japan's need for foreign foodstuffs is estimated by her Ministry of International Trade and Industry to be valued at $600 million annually. Mainland China was formerly one of the principal sources of these commodities. Today Japan is importing rice, soybeans, wheat, and other foods from the United States, Canada and Europe. Since her exports to the dollar area in 1954 were valued at approximately $500 million less than her imports, she could not have met her debit balance were it not for funds received from the United States in payment for materials and services provided by her for American forces in Japan. In other words her economy is far from being self-supporting, a situation not relished by Japanese leaders in every category and of every political persuasion.

Not to be defeated by the absence of official contacts, Japanese businessmen utilized their Association for the Promotion of International Trade to obtain an agreement with the trade delegation sent to Japan by the People's Republic of China. A group of Diet members collaborated in formulating the agreement, which was signed in Tokyo on May 4, 1955, effective for one year only unless renewed by mutual consent. It provided for total exports and imports amounting to 60 million pounds sterling, 30 million in each category. It was to be implemented by contracts between Japanese businessmen on the one side and public corporations and private merchants of China on the other. Provision was included for inspection of goods in both countries before payment was made. Disputes arising in connection with terms or performance of the contracts were to be settled, if possible, by negotiation between the parties. If not so settled, they were to be submitted to arbitration, each party being represented and an umpire being appointed by agreement. The signatories further agreed to obtain governmental guarantees for the entrance and exit of arbitrators and for the execution of arbitral awards. Provision was made also for the holding of two Chinese trade fairs in Japan in 1955 and for two Japanese fairs in China in 1956. Looking toward permanence in improved trade relations the parties agreed to maintain representatives in each other's country, to accord diplomatic privileges if acceptable to their governments, and to endeavor to have their governments conduct trade negotiations at the earliest possible date.

 appended to the agreement was a table of commodities to be exported by each country. From Japan were to go machinery, ships, railway equipment, and various processed metals; also chemicals, medicines, dyestuffs, spinning, weaving and other machines, tools, electrical and wireless equipment, and motor vehicles; also fishing implements, cotton and woolen fabrics, cattle, etc. China was to export coal, iron ore, pig iron, manganese ore, bauxite, antimony and asbestos; also rice, salt, soy beans, oils and fats; also bristles, pigskins, raw silk, carpets, 'straw braid,' and other raw materials. The extent of these lists testifies to the importance of
unhampered trade to both countries. While Japan's trade with China has increased with the lightening of the embargo imposed by the United Nations during the Korean war, it remains small in comparison with the 34 per cent of total Japanese trade which it formed in 1939. Although the further expansion of Sino-Japanese trade would normally call for diplomatic relations, it may be inferred from Premier Hatoyama's Diet statement of April 23, quoted above, that his government will be content, temporarily, with a trade agreement. But the pressure of industrial and business interests, the growing strength of the Socialists, and the reviving spirit of nationalism are forces which the Liberal-Democrats cannot resist indefinitely if they wish to retain office.

Japan's foreign policy, apart from its greater inclination toward cooperation with the United States, is in several respects like that of India. It seeks, through nonpartisanship with either side in the "cold war," to obtain security, to enjoy the benefits of world-wide commerce, and to hold open the door to peaceful co-existence. It eschews the building up of a large military establishment while turning from disarmament to a small, purely defensive, army, navy and air force. It assumes that internal communism can easily be kept in check and that the danger to peace within Japan arises not from communism but from antagonisms resulting from her failure, during the postwar decade, to regain a fully independent status and membership in the United Nations, the badge of political and cultural equality. As in relation to the prewar issues of immigration and naturalization, the underlying need of the Japanese, as of other Oriental nations in varying degree, is that their racial dignity be recognized.

Japan's Neutralism

There is something to be said in extenuation of Japan's "neutralism" or, preferably, nonpartisanship. But it need hardly be spelled out, since the fate of Japan as a participant in World War III, should it occur, would be that of Hiroshima many times compounded. The Japanese find it difficult to look beyond such a war to its consequences in the event of a Communist victory. However, they are not in a position, quite apart from their security arrangements with the United States, to be unqualifiedly neutral in the strict sense of neutrality since they agreed at San Francisco "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action." This obligation, however, obviously has no reference to nonpartisanship in time of peace nor to a war not involving the United Nations.

In attempting to understand the current policy of Japan one cannot overlook the apparent general desire of her people to be free from the heavy cost of large-scale rearmament and from a revived "Supreme Command" and the militarists' probable renewed interference in every aspect of the political and social order. That this attitude should have arisen in Japan is something of a miracle. In the light of history and of what happened in Germany between the world wars, one might justifiably doubt that it will endure. But the policies of friendly states should be directed toward its encouragement, not toward the revival of militarism. Japan in the role of mediator between democracy and communism—which her statesmen seem to be seeking—may not be well cast. The conduct of World War II by their predecessors—still fresh in memory—may prompt questions as to whether they are either sincere in seeking the role or capable of playing it. Japan's immaturity in her understanding of liberalism and her penchant for bureaucracy add weight to such questions. She has, however, one qualification that no other people can claim: she knows from experience what atomic warfare means.

In the contest for the Japanese political mind, democracy is winning over communism; the people have weighed communism in the balance and found it wanting. They have not outlawed it because they are not afraid of it. Moreover, they came through the postwar Occupation with a sense of gratitude and a feeling of admiration for Americans, although these sentiments were mixed with resentment and chagrin. They looked beneath the surface of the un-Japanese changes that were imposed upon them and saw that the motivation was good. Many of these changes will disappear but there will remain a permanent residue of liberalism. It seems wise, therefore, to put doubt aside and to afford Japan an opportunity to attempt the role of nonpartisan and intermediary. The United States stands to gain thereby. Democracy is winning not because representatives of Western peoples have fulsomely proclaimed its superiority to all other ideologies and forms of government but because the Japanese have found that it is effective in peace and war and interesting and adaptable at home. Good works and courteous conduct in personal relations and recognition of equality in public life are its most effective advocates. The Japanese are particularly sensitive to criticism and correspondingly responsive to considerate treatment.

It would seem to be crucially important to capitalize upon the favorable sentiment toward democracy and the West before elements opposed to cooperation with the United States can return to power. Communism and rightist authoritarianism are latent forces of unknown strength. Although in theory at opposite ends of the political spectrum, their distaste for liberalism
and internationalism and their liking for violence invite their collaboration against Japan’s renovated parliamentary order. That order, while strongly impregnated with bureaucracy, is popular today and has the sincere support of the farmers, organized labor, businessmen and the professional and intellectual classes. The political parties, if not yet cleansed of venality, are vigorous, and elections bring out a larger proportion of voters than is common in many Western states. Emperor Hirohito, more a constitutional ruler and less a mere symbol of authority than the new Constitution would suggest, is a reliable bulwark of parliamentarism. The winds today blow fair for Japan’s new ship of state but the cloud of reaction, now no bigger than a man’s hand, may grow into a typhoon unless dissipated by the sun of Western consideration.

In practical terms this means that any feature of America’s present relationship with Japan which affords grounds for charges that our government is treating her as a satellite should be abandoned. It means revision of the security treaty or its termination if that be the desire of Japan. It means non-interference with her foreign policy and greater attention to Japanese views in the administration of the Ryukyus and in the conduct of nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific, to the end that fishermen and the fish upon which they depend for a livelihood and which are an important part of the Japanese diet will not be endangered. It means a trade policy which takes account of Japan’s necessity to balance exports against imports. It is incumbent upon Western peoples as well as their governments to recall the disastrous effect of their prewar commercial policies upon Japan, whose economic position today is far less favorable than it was before the war.

If we must assume that Soviet Russia is determined to destroy Western civilization and that she can rely upon the Chinese people to forget their debt to the West and to remember only the indignities suffered by their great country under what Sun Yat-sen termed “hypo-colonialism,” the instinct for self-preservation will continue to urge that the present-day world is no place for “neutrals.” But it may also be argued that partisanship cannot be compelled and that, should democracy and communism collide, Japan, if treated as an equal by the democracies, will be on their side; also, that her prospects of building up her strength to a significant degree will improve if her economy develops freely through world-wide contacts. It is apparent that Japan is thinking in these terms, while holding firmly to her desire for friendly cooperation with the West, particularly with the United States. Japan, the only country whose constitution prohibits war or armament, and whose geographical situation renders her extremely vulnerable, is quite naturally resolved to contribute her best efforts to the prevention of a third world war in which she would be crushed between the two major opponents.

BOOKS ON THE PACIFIC AREA


Mr. Shabad’s book presents comprehensive and up-to-date material on many basic aspects of contemporary China. The first chapter, on the physical setting of China, is concise and adequate. Chapter two, on the political framework, is very up-to-date, the details concerning some eighty national autonomous areas for minority groups (pp. 33-35) being the best English source at present available on the subject. The third chapter, on China’s economic structure, contains a wealth of information but could perhaps have been expanded beyond the present 43 pages in order to include more interpretive analysis. Chapters four to sixteen, which constitute Part II, the larger part of the volume (175 out of 270 pages of text), give excellent and detailed descriptions of the twenty two provinces, the autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, and many leading cities. This second part is divided into thirteen major geographical areas for purposes of discussion. The book concludes with a 23-page index, which provides a useful list of all geographic names mentioned in the book, romanized in both the Wade-Giles and the Postal systems. Sixteen maps and forty-three tables are helpfully scattered throughout the text. The bibliography, consisting mainly of source materials in the Russian language, is well-selected but the list would benefit by a few additions—for example, the Ts'ao-kin chung-kwo-sheng ts'au (The Most Recent Provincial Atlas of China, Hongkong, Ta-Chung Book Co., June 1955), Statistical Report on the Nation’s Economy, released by the State Statistical Bureau, Peking, in October 1955 (summarized in Hsin-hua yueh-pao, The New China Monthly, November 1955, pp. 181-189), and Professor George Cressey’s Land of the 500 Million: A Geography of China (1955).

For example, Table 33 (p. 79) shows a steady increase of livestock in China between 1949 and 1954, with hogs multiplying from 53 million in 1949 to 101 million in 1954. But reports from China in recent years indicate a shortage of hog supply at the domestic market, a problem which still exists in 1956. The data on the increased production of major crops (pp. 73-76) would have been made more meaningful if the major causes of this increase (for example, the yield per hectare of these crops in the past several years, improvement in the method of surveying and registering of crop land, the reclamation of waste land, etc.) were analyzed. The average yield per unit of land for rice, wheat, potatoes, and “miscellaneous grains” from the years 1950 to 1953 was reported, for instance, in the Jen-min-jih-pao (People’s Daily) of November 3, 1955. Moreover, in discussing farm land, the crop acreage (including double cropping areas) is just as important as the cultivated acreage.

Although it may have been impractical to quote sources for all the data, footnote references for the more important statements and figures would have improved the book. Without these there is no way of ascertaining either the origin or
the time period of the data, some of which may be disputed by other writers (for instance different sets of figures are available for the peak pre-Communist production data).

The above comments are not intended to detract from the high praise to which Mr. Shabad's work is entitled. It provides comprehensive data which are more up-to-date than any other single English work that the reviewer has encountered. It also has a number of uniquely strong points. The comparison of developments in China and in the Soviet Union (for example, the redefinition of rural places as urban places, p. 37) is illuminating. The explanations given for the meaning of Chinese geographic terms (such as the Thai meaning—twelve rice lands—of the term Shih Shang Bao Nan, p. 181) are instructive. The discussion of the historical background of many areas and cities (for example, Peking, p. 105) is another merit of the volume. In short, Mr. Shabad's book is a major contribution to studies of contemporary China and will remain for a long time one of the standard English reference works.

Harvard University

CHAO KUO-CHUN


Mr. Starobin visited China in 1952-53 as a correspondent for the Daily Worker and "as an American Marxist." His account bears the impress of both identifications. Like the Chinese Communist magazine People's China, which he calls "probably the single most helpful publication" for understanding the new regime, he takes us on the well-worn tour of the model village cooperative, the Huai River projects, the "people's" cultural exhibits, and the festive parades in Tien An-men square. Unlike People's China, however, Mr. Starobin offers clues to the controls which confront an outsider in China. All questions for interviews "were supposed to be prepared in advance ... we found the answers prepared, too." He found that a Party member's explanation of purges "covered the same ground verbatim" as did the Cominform journal. "Try as I did, I could not get a more living picture of the process from the man with whom I talked." To be sure those whom he interviewed "all ad libbed and rarely evaded further questions," but one searches the responses in vain for a word of criticism against the new regime. Mr. Starobin captures the spirit of activity and construction, as well as the fixed determination of young Communist "cadres" to accomplish goals of physical and spiritual "reconstruction" but his account suffers from the partisan and polemical approach which shanks his reporting.

Michigan State University

ALLEN S. WHITING


This little book is intended to give the reader who has only a casual interest in the population in India a quick glance at the changes in size in her population during the thirty years from 1921 to 1951, to call attention to some of the chief factors affecting its fertility, mortality and morbidity and to emphasize the need for the control of fertility if the people of India are to achieve low death rates and a fairly good level of living. It is written with vigor and is well adapted to its purpose.

Dr. Chandrasekhar notes that India's agriculture is very inefficient and that over the centuries it has been so badly managed that a serious depletion of the fertility of the soil has taken place. Furthermore, he is convinced that even with a considerable improvement in agriculture the level of living cannot be much improved "unless and until a substantial number of people now dependent on the land are transferred to some other productive employment." This leads him, in common with most other Indian students, to emphasize the need for industrialization, although he realizes that the road to this end is difficult and progress may be discouragingly slow. He finds no hope for the relief from the present low level of living either in the redistribution of population within India or in the emigration of Indians to other lands.

Dr. Chandrasekhar concludes that the only hope of better living for the mass of Indians lies in the rapid reduction of the birth rate. He believes that the Hindu view of life is not hostile to planned parenthood and to the voluntary control of births, but he does not seem to expect much reduction in the birth rate during the next two or three decades even in spite of the fact that the Government looks with favor on the movement to restrict births and to undertaking a vigorous campaign to encourage planned parenthood. He sees many and serious difficulties which must be overcome before India's population will become approximately stationary and until this happens he appears to doubt that her economy will have much chance to grow substantially faster than her numbers.

Oxford, Ohio

WARREN S. THOMPSON


This novel details the love affairs of a young Englishman in Thailand. The "woman of Bangkok" who fills his time and empties his pockets is Vilai, a Thai dance hall hostess and prostitute, notorious, unscrupulous, and utterly mercenary. Her charms hypnotize and finally ruin him. After coming within a hair of committing murder to keep Vilai in spending money, he is dismissed by his employer, a British import firm, and sent home to England. By that time Vilai has attached herself to an American, a "do-gooder" who presumably in time will get the same treatment. The author may have had in mind an allegory: the fickle Thailand, fliriting first with the businessman Britain, now turning her attention toward a philanthropic but naive America, but the details of the allegory, if it were intended, are not always clear.

Apart from the plot, which is uncomplicated and uninspiring, the book abounds with information about what might be called covert cultural behavior, the kind that travelers' accounts omit. There are some provocative descriptions of everyday life as a member of the Western commercial set, but generally this part of the hero's brief career is treated only tangentially. The author writes of Thailand from firsthand experience, having lived there for the last four years running a fleet of jeeps for a United Nations organization. The background is authentic and his characters, Thai and European, are incisively drawn, but the unabashed realistic descriptions of brothels, taxi-dance halls and the like do not warrant the dust cover's claim that "the author has brought his Siamese setting gorgeously to life." It is not the old stereotype of the "Land of Smiles" that emerges but something more real perhaps.

Yale University

RICHARD J. COUGHLIN


These two books, one a monograph on the diplomacy of the Siberian Intervention and the other a collection of special studies on the Yalta Conference, are excellent works by young historians who are endeavoring to dispel the foggy confusion around the interpretation of these two important episodes in American diplomatic history. Dr. Unterberger has given us the most definitive discussion thus far of the history of events collected mainly from American archival material on U.S. participation in the Siberian intervention. The study sheds considerable light on what happened, beginning with August 2, 1918 (when Major General William S. Graves received the secret message to go to Kansas City and see the Secretary of War, who there gave him the fateful orders to proceed to Siberia), and on the involvement of the Great Powers in Siberia during the two years to follow.

American participation in the Allied Intervention was a frustrating experience for the officials charged with it. It was as Dr. Unterberger writes "a live struggle against the intrigues of Great Britain, France and Japan." France and Great Britain believed in helping until the end their Russian friends fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia. The Japanese supported some anti-Bolshevik leaders, but played the game of "divide and rule." President Wilson was rightly suspicious of Japan's motives and on Allied pressure accepted Japanese intervention in Siberia, without American participation; then he changed his mind and espoused a joint intervention. In 1920, the United States withdrew its troops but the State Department, as Dr. Unterberger shows, continued to protest for the next two and a half years Japan's remaining in Siberia. The main weakness of Dr. Unterberger's study is that, while it is excellent in the careful presentation of the diplomatic story, the author is somewhat remiss in not giving as much consideration as is justified by its importance to the struggle between the Reds and the Whites, and particularly to the internal politics of the Kolchak group in Siberia.

The Meaning of Yalta, which covers a later event in American diplomatic history, is written by four young American historians who, like Dr. Unterberger, have profited greatly from the advice and counsel of their mentor, Professor Paul H. Clyde at Duke University. The value of the book does not lie in being an intensive diplomatic analysis of an episode in American foreign relations like America's Siberian intervention, but in the authors' critical study of the Yalta Papers which have revealed additional insights into this climactic event of February 1945. The four main problems of the Yalta Conference are discussed as individual studies in this work: the problems of Germany, of Russian power in central eastern Europe, of the Far East, and of the United Nations. While these discussions are built around the State Department's published Yalta Papers, each of the writers has very extensively utilized the current literature on all of these topics and the discussion of the problems is enriched by a careful incorporation of all relevant material culled from pertinent books and articles. A very extensive bibliographical essay completes this valuable symposium.

University of Washington


In these lectures, given at Swarthmore College, Professor Redfield continues his search for concepts and methods of approach that have become necessary since anthropology has extended its scope from primitive to civilized societies. The peasantry is not isolated from other classes. Priesthood and gentry exercise upon it influences that affect its outlook and its practices. In the light of the values that result from his mode of life, the peasant considers himself morally superior to the townsman; but he respects, and in his turn develops, many of those traits which he knows at first only marginally. In China and India, for example, the countryman's culture overlaps that of other circles. In the present period of nascent democracy, his aspirations tend to mingle with theirs. His outlook is conservative, but it is not stagnant. He may be more superstitious than the townsman (who, however, often is as yet no more than a transplanted peasant), because his life is more circumscribed; but he usually respects those ranges of culture to which he has limited access, provided he becomes sufficiently aware of them. And often he is a shrewd observer, not without humor.

This bare outline can do no justice to the wealth of ideas which Dr. Redfield, with his usual lucidity, presents in this unpretentious little book. In fact, these lectures signify a new departure in an important field of social study. Henceforth it will no longer be creditable to talk loosely about either tradition or the peasantry.

Youkens, N. Y.

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