### INTERVIEW TIMETABLE

**Friday, October 1, 1955**

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**Morning (9:00 a.m.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Trun-Van-Dat</td>
<td>(palace) Cabinet Director</td>
<td>Mode</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. To-Tien-Nghia</td>
<td>(Bungalow) Newspaper, Weapons, Statistics</td>
<td>Haney</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Pham-Van-Toan</td>
<td>(Bungalow) Political affairs</td>
<td>Snyder</td>
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**Afternoon (3:00 p.m.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Pham-Ha-Tuong</td>
<td>(Cabinet) General Administrative Service</td>
<td>Rolland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bui-Van-Hai</td>
<td>(Bungalow) Expelling Bureau</td>
<td>Haney</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Nguyen-Buy-Tien</td>
<td>Budget and Administrative control</td>
<td>Snyder</td>
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</tbody>
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INTERVIEW TIMETABLE

Tuesday, October 4, 1955

Morning (8:30 a.m.)

Miss Tin  Mr. Le-Minh-Cuc:  Bookkeeping (Palace, First floor)  Snyder & Mode
Vu Quang Van  Mr. Tran-Nhut-Hac:  Personnel (Palace, First floor)  Rolland & Smuckler
Mr. Hoanh  Mr. Nguyen-Van-Minh:  Foreign Question (Bungalow)  Haney

Afternoon (3:00 p.m.)

Mr. Thien  Mr. Nguyen-Van-Nghia:  Coordination (Bungalow)  Haney
Nguyen Khien Hanh  Mr. Pham-Van-Dau:  Housing (113 Rue Pasteur; ex-Pellerin)  Snyder & Smuckler
Nguyen Ten Gia  Mr. Pham-Ba-Tuong:  General Administration (Bungalow)  Rolland & Mode
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Contact Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, Oct 25</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Pham-Van-VINH</td>
<td>SVN Del. Office, Rolland and Tin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, Oct 25</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Vuong-Van-KHUE</td>
<td>28, Mac-Dinh-Chi</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Ex-Massageur)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday, Oct 27</td>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Cao-The-RAO</td>
<td>SVN Del. Office, Hode and Linholm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, Oct 27</td>
<td>2:30 a.m.</td>
<td>General Tran-Van-MINH</td>
<td>Sauckler and Hoe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35, Hung-Vuong</td>
<td>(Ex-Frederic Brouet)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hode and Tin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday, Oct 28</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Le-Cong-TANH</td>
<td>Snyder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday, Oct 28</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Commandant Tran-Van-QUIEN</td>
<td>Sauckler and Hoe</td>
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<td>SVN Del. Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday, Oct 29</td>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Tran-Be-TANH</td>
<td>Sauckler and Hoe</td>
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<td>Surete building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, Oct 31</td>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. To-Van-QUA</td>
<td>Mode and Quan</td>
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<td>SVN Del. Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, Oct 31</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Nguyen-Cong-TUEN</td>
<td>Snyder</td>
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<td>SVN Del. Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday, Nov 2</td>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Nguyen-Van-DINH</td>
<td>Rolland and Van</td>
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<td>20bis Phan-Dinh-Phung</td>
<td>(Ex-Richeaud)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday, Nov 3</td>
<td>8:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Truong-Vinh-CAC</td>
<td>Mode and Quan</td>
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<td>459-61, Galliéni</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday, Nov 3</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Mr. Pham-Quang-BONG</td>
<td>Snyder</td>
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<td>Cong-Ly street, facing Justice court</td>
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</tr>
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TO: Walter W. Mode, Deputy Advisor for Field Administration
FROM: Wayne W. Snyder, Specialist in Economic Administration
SUBJECT: Report on Field Trip to Dalat and Djiring

DATE: October 27, 1955

This is to give you the itinerary of interviews held in connection with our current survey of regional, provincial and municipal government in the P.M.S., to supplement material contained in the separate studies and to give you some of my over-all impressions, observations and views made during the trip.

The itinerary of interviews was as follows:

Monday, October 17

(1600-1730) Director of Cabinet (P.M.S.), Mr. Nguyen Van Hieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Mode, Gregory, Snyder, Quan

Tuesday, October 18

(0800-1000) Mayor of Dalat, Mr. Cao Minh Hieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Mode and Mr. Gregory

(0900-1000) Chief of Cabinet for Sureté (P.M.S), Mr. Dang Van Duc
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder and Mr. Quan

(1000-1130) Director of Social Action (P.M.S), Miss Nguyen Thi Chau
Interviewed by: Mr. Mode and Mr. Quan

(1030-1230) Director of the Civil Guard (P.M.S), Mr. Cao Xuan Thieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory and Mr. Snyder

(1430-1530) Inspector for Financial, Political and Administrative Affairs (P.M.S), Mr. Pham Nhu Phien
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory and Mr. Snyder

(1530-1700) Director of Legislation and General Administration (P.M.S), Mr. Ung Sam
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

(1715-1900) Director of Direct and Indirect Taxes (P.M.S), Mr. Nguyen Dang Suu
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan
Wednesday, October 19

(0800-0900) Chief of Civilian Cabinet (PMS), Mr. Ton That Kha
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

(0900-0930) Head of Personnel (PMS), Mr. Nguyen Quy Thanh
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

(0930-1130) The Délégué to the PMS, Mr. Ton That Hoi
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

(1430-1530) Head of Personnel (PMS), Mr. Nguyen Quy Thanh
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder

(1430-1645) The Mayor of Dalat, Cao Minh Hieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory and Quan

(1545-1700) Chief of Civilian Cabinet and Head of Personnel (Dalat),
Mr. Ly Xuan Dai
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder

(1650-1745) Chief of Administration Bureau of Information (PMS),
Mr. Nguyen Van Hoa
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory and Mr. Quan

(1800-1900) Director of Sureté (PMS), Mr. Nguyen Van Hay
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

Thursday, October 20

(0700-0800) Director of Financial Affairs (PMS), Mr. Pham Quan Phuc
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder and Mr. Quan

(0730-0930) The Mayor of Dalat, Mr. Cao Minh Hieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory

(0800-0900) Director of Economic and Social Affairs (PMS), Mr. Nguyen Dieu
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder and Quan

(0900-1015) Head of Budget Bureau (PMS), Mr. Huynh Van Nghia
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder and Quan

(1030-1145) Director of Labor Affairs (PMS), Mr. Paul Doan Movi
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

(1430-1530) Director of the National Gendarmerie National (PMS),
Mr. Capt. Vo Kim Quy
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan
Regional Administrator for External Aid (PMS), Mr. Pham Huu Thanh
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder

Receiver for the PTT of the Dalat district, Mr. Nguyen Thuc Cang
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory and Snyder

Friday, October 21

The Province Chief of Djiring, Mr. Nguyen Huu Dzien
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

Director of Civilian Cabinet and Director of the Police (Djiring), Mr. Tran Luu Dzu
Interviewed by: Mr. Gregory, Snyder and Quan

The President of the Courts for the PMS, Mr. Trinh Xuan Ngan
Interviewed by: Mr. Snyder

Due to the absence of many officials during our stay in Dalat, it was not possible to contact all the directors of services nor was it possible to recheck some of the discrepancies found in reports from different sources. Some of these differences were not important, such as differences in personnel level furnished by central personnel and the total furnished by the bureau division or service head himself. For example, the Mayor of Dalat stated that his Public works service (La Voirie) had 200 employees whereas his head of Personnel admitted to 20, but the difference is certainly to be found in the varying number of day laborers employed to keep the highways and streets clear of obstructing vegetation. Another discrepancy was that of the Service of Social Action, where the Head of Personnel for the PMS stated that there were 11 persons in the service while the Director, Miss Chau told you that there were only seven in all. Another instance of this type of conflicting information comes from the figure on police for the Province of Djiring furnished by the Sureté in Dalat of 20 persons while the Chief of Police at Djiring only acknowledged 7.

These conflicting examples do not point to a critical situation needing immediate administrative attention, but, rather, seem to me indicative of the very loose system of "accounting" used which is, if not completely theoretical, at best mere bookkeeping.
More serious were the conflicting opinions as to where administrative and technical responsibility lay for inter and intra-relationships.

Going down the list on interviews, I point out the following conflicting views on the dependency of certain services and agencies:

Generally, the technical services having headquarters in Dalat for the PMS (excepting Health and Education which have regional headquarters at Ban Me Thuot) are divided into two categories: (1) Those responsible to the Délégué for both administrative and technical matters and (2) those responsible to the Délégué on administrative matters only and responsible to the interested Ministries in Saigon for technical matters. The first discrepancy in this rather neat division is that the Head of Personnel for the PMS has no control over personnel in the second category (that is he has no information on the number of personnel nor any authority over them). Secondly, the services which in theory are administratively and technically responsible to the Délégué, such as Sûreté (quite naturally) and Regional Aid Administration, are not responsible to him on personnel matters.

The Chief of the Cabinet for the Sûreté told this interviewer that the provincial police (excluding the Sûreté agents) were divided into two categories: First, those within the cities who depend administratively and budgetwise on the Province Chief and budget, while responsible to the regional direction of the Sûreté on technical matters; secondly, those outside the city who depend upon the Sûreté for budget, administrative and technical matters. In Djiring, the Chief of Police
stated that this was not so and that all the police were responsible to him and he to the Province Chief and that he did not have responsibilities to either the Provincial Director of the Sûreté nor to the regional direction at Dalat.

The Service of Social Action until most recently was considered a bureau of the Délégue's government and was responsible to the director of Economic and Social Affairs, Mr. Nguyen Dieu. The transfer of this office to its proper role has left confusion of responsibility in the mind of the Director of Economic and Social Affairs, and he stated as an example that both he and Miss Chau received invitations to all affairs concerning social affairs.

The Director of Direct and Indirect Taxes has triple responsibility; he has responsibility to the government of the Délégue, the Ministry of Finance in Saigon and to the Mayor of Dalat for whom he acts as tax agency for the Municipality of Dalat.

The interview with the Director of Information was made for Mr. Gregory by the Mayor of Dalat who told him that it was a service of Dalat; but at his interview with the Chief of Administration, he was told that for all practical purposes the Information service at Dalat is completely independent from all authority at Dalat (both from the Mayor and the Délégue) and is solely responsible to the Ministry of Information in Saigon.

Similarly, the interview which we had with the Director of Labor was
made for us by the Civilian Chief of Cabinet for the Délégué who stated that this was a bureau of the Service of Social Affairs which is a part of the Division of Economic and Social Affairs within the Délégué's government. But at the interview, the Director, Mr. Moui, stated that his service theoretically came within the categorie of services having administrative responsibility to the Délégué and technical responsibility to his Minister of Labor in Saigon, but that in this instance he also depended upon personnel from the Délégué.

The phrase which was repeated by nearly every official was the following:

The PMS is a new area totally undeveloped, which until only six months ago remained under the direct control of the French and the Royal Domaine of Bao Dai. And certainly I would be much at fault if I should prepare recommendations for changes in administrative structure or procedure which in point of fact have yet to be re-established. Though administrative directives have attempted to define lines of responsibility and authority, the entire structure of the government of the PMS is based upon very particular regulations and laws, some of them anteceding 1912. Many of the working responsibilities of services and divisions within the PMS government are defined by directives that have no relationship whatsoever to the central government of Viêt-Nam in Saigon.
Hence, I feel that unless we were prepared to offer the most extensive and detailed recommendations concerning the authority, responsibility and working procedures for the many services and division, any recommendations that we make towards the PMS should be limited to two fundamental points which everyone there and in Saigon is wondering about: The future existence of the regional government to the PMS and the role of the Provincial Chief.

Concerning the first, I have this to say: Though nearly every official was careful to forward his remarks about the PMS with comments on its newness, its nearly totally undeveloped nature and the special problem presented by its majority of mountainous tribes (possibly numbering 10-1 Vietnamese), I do not feel that its future existence is justified. I base (1) this conclusion on three views: It was my opinion after talking with more than twenty-five officials in the PMS that the central Ministries in Saigon were not taking the proper responsibility towards the problems in the PMS. The Central government has dumped the problem into the lap of the regional government (who nevertheless is quite willing to accept it) and has forgotten about it. If the central government were directly responsible for affairs in the PMS, I believe that projects and problems would be presented sooner and solutions found (2). The Provincial Chief must be given more direct responsibility and authority. I would recommend that all matters be within his jurisdiction except the most technical of advice which must necessarily come from the concerned Ministry in Saigon. He is not capable of accepting total interest in his province under the present setup where all final authority lies off in the mountain resort of Dalat where things pass in good time. To involve him in all the affairs of this province he must be given the authority to carry out those responsibilities.
(3) The problem of communication. In the PMS under present conditions and those which are likely to exist in the foreseeable future, it is as easy for the Province Chief of Djiring to communicate with Saigon as it is with Dalat, and the other three provinces of Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku and Kontum are said to have easier communication with Saigon than with Dalat (the reason why the two regional services of Health and Education are located in Ban Me Thuot instead of Dalat). The argument presented by the officials of the government of the Délégué to the PMS that since the PMS is a new and undeveloped country, it therefore needs a special representative body to coordinate and present its views and needs to the central government has some validity; but the reality of the matter, I believe, is that due to the communications difficulties, the lacking authority of the provincial Chief, and the uninterest on the part of the central government, it cannot presently do so and I do not see how the effort needed to create a body capable of so doing would be of lasting or contributive value to the already colossal structure which underlies the existing system.

The Central government and the country of Viêt-Nam have one basic need: to involve themselves in each other's affairs. After 80 years of control, attempts to divide the people and their aspirations by the French, any furthering of this system is predetermined to lead to disunited unstable leadership and underfined goals. The PMS does not need a special body to represent its views any more than the sect areas of the Cao Daiist or the Hoa Haoist. Viêt-Nam must be reunited and integrated into one social and economic entity ... indivisible and
united towards its future role as a republic built upon solidarity of purpose, not divided into special treatment areas of quasi-autonomous goals and purpose.