January, 1956

INFORMATION CONCERNING POLICE TECHNICAL AIDS EMPLOYED

It is mutually agreed that the following principles and policies will be observed in the assignment of police personnel and the manner in which they will carry out their assignments:

1) All personnel now to be appointed by HGU and will be regarded as responsible to the HGU technical assistance group in the same manner as other personnel assigned to the HGU group.

2) Such personnel are not to engage in direct operations but will have teaching and training as their primary duties.

3) The President of Vietnam is to be informed concerning their assignment and in to give his concurrence.

4) There is to be a single channel for the distribution of supplies, which distribution in Saigon is to be carried out in accordance with standard HGU policies, as laid down by the Chief Adviser, the Executive Officer, and the Deputy Adviser in charge of the Police Project of HGU.

5) Terminal dates for the assignment of personnel engaged to carry on special training and teaching are to be fixed. Such personnel will leave Vietnam upon the termination of their teaching and training duties with HGU.
To:       Dr. Ralph M. Anderson, Chief Advisor
From:    Stanley E. Henderson, Coordinator
Subject: Police Program Directive

The University desires to retain its involvement in the police program in Saigon. MSU has a specialized competence beneficial, we believe, to the U.S. technical assistance program. Furthermore, MSU has a long-range interest in continuing its support because of its plan to develop its on-campus international police curriculum. However, to make its contribution in Vietnam an optimum role the University’s role must be more narrowly defined than at present.

MSU must withdraw from those action-oriented aspects of the police program; e.g., the administration of U.S. aid equipment, the work of Art’s friends, etc. MSU’s efforts have to be concentrated in those educational and advisory activities that will represent an extension of the School of Police Administration’s on-campus program. These will include training, research, reorganizational work, and such specialized fields as radio communications, traffic, etc. Only by doing this can East Lansing provide substantive guidance and thereby make the University’s involvement meaningful.

Realistically, MSU can furnish only two or three of its campus police faculty, these can provide leadership to a staff in Saigon of no more than about eight. As the size of the police group in Saigon is large, the University’s function becomes predominantly recruitment and administration and, again, less substantive.

Further, the present nature of the police program has subjected MSU to criticism. An educationally-oriented program in Saigon enriches the experience of MSU staff in a manner that enhances the on-campus program. Action-oriented and economic aid operations do not optimally draw on the University’s competence nor occur to it the academic environment and prestige it should obtain.

A meaningful and operationally-feasible division of effort along these lines can and must be made with MSU. The lines are clear. We urge this because of the University’s strong desire to provide maximum support to the U.S. technical assistance program in Vietnam.

MSU:

CC: President John A. Hannah
     Philip J. Clay
     Thomas H. Hamilton
     Alfred L. Baikye
     Allen L. Kangas
     Arthur Keckleman
TO: Coordinator  
FROM: Chief Advisor  
SUBJECT: Discussion at Embassy

Since they said it was not on the way to Washington and I feel that we should get on with our planning and programming in the police field, Howard Hoyt and I paid a visit to some of the people at the Embassy to talk about their future thinking in specialized training. Out of the discussion came several interesting facts: (1) a program will be continued in the specialized field and will have to be included in the future programming about four professional people would be needed; (2) they are not sure that such people could be included in the new USCM division under a split operation unless the USCM function is defined so as to make their inclusion a natural transfer; (3) only one of the existing staff would be continued very far into the next contract year, and he could be transferred along with other specialists into a new USCM division providing the function of the USCM division is defined so as to make the transfer natural; (4) they want to be considered flexible; (5) they feel quite insistent on both the need and feasibility of continuing this specialized work, and (6) the point was made to them that if it becomes a choice of including such specialists or phasing out our police program entirely, the latter would be our choice.

As I see it, the issue will be drawn on the question of how the USCM function is defined. I am assuming that an overseeing level is enough to make the transfer a natural one. If he cannot, then more squeezing is going to have to be done on their side since I assume that the University position should and must remain as it was stated in our conversations before my departure last March.
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it is still highly probable that we will need seven or eight professional police people on our staff. Since it is the National Security Council in Washington which is handling the Civil Guard issue (as I understand it out here) and since President Diem himself is directly involved in the outcome of the issue here, I do not see how we can do much more than act on these high levels of probability. It is possible to talk with potential staff members the way I have talked to Manepolli, that is letting them know what the probabilities are and giving them assurance that our plans will probably go into effect. Would it not be possible for Brandstatter to operate on this basis also?

2. In rereading my memorandum of December 4 which seemed to be unclear in the last paragraph, I can see where a certain amount of clarification would be necessary. Let me give you the background to that last paragraph. It is probable that the police program will be split between WACM and MSU. If it is split, it might be split in one of several different ways—functionally or organizationally. For example, we may go ahead with certain functions for all of the police organizations in Vietnam, or we may be lined up with several organizations, such as the national and municipal police, and let all functions for the Civil Guard be performed by MSU direct hire personnel. Which way the split develops will depend on negotiations once we know the outcome of the Civil Guard issue. We prefer the organizational split, but there may be some persuasive arguments for a combination of organizational and functional division.

If the Civil Guard issue is resolved in such a way that only eight or nine additional American staff members (instead of the 20 to 22 now planned) are needed, it may be that of the eight or nine Civil Guard advisors about three or four would be involved full-time in training and the others would be concerned with equipment matters and general advisory work. If that is the case, we may be asked to increase our seven to eight estimate for MSU so that we would include on our own staff two, three, or four Civil Guard trainers—perhaps former state police specialists. This would mean that instead of the reduction to seven or eight we would have a reduction to 10 or 12. It is in this question which I am tossing to East Lansing in the last paragraph of my December 4 memorandum, that is, would we be willing to compromise and pick up the training function for the Civil Guard if it involved only three or four people?

You will note that I refer to the fact that MSU will not take on a "massive effort in the Civil Guard field." We may be called upon, however, to pick up the small effort if such an effort becomes U.S. Government policy.

NEH/Dec
January 31, 1962

His Excellency
Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem
President of the Republic of Viet Nam
Saigon, Viet Nam

My dear Mr. President:

Although the Government of Viet Nam has made a formal request for a renewal of its contract with Michigan State University, Your Excellency is reported to have expressed some misgivings over the advisability of a new contract. Therefore, the Chief Adviser of the Michigan State University Viet Nam Advisory Group has been instructed to ascertain whether there exists the basis for a new contract—a basis which can be founded only on mutual trust, confidence, and understanding.

MSU has developed a close affinity and staunch loyalty to Viet Nam. The problems confronted by Viet Nam in strengthening and developing the country, creating a great self-sufficient nation, and resisting and overcoming communism, have become also the problems and concern of MSU. The National Institute of Administration, around which MSU centers its activities, faces a critical period ahead. If the Institute is to realize its aspirations, hopes, and potentiality for the betterment of government administration in Viet Nam, continued technical assistance and financial aid are necessary for at least the next three years. In spite of the fact that a continuation of its project in Viet Nam entails sacrifices on the part of the University, MSU is willing to renew its contract, provided certain issues can be resolved to the satisfaction of both the Government of Viet Nam and Michigan State University.

The purpose of this letter and my forthcoming visit with Your Excellency is to attempt to clarify the University's position on several matters which are of concern to you, to determine whether we can agree on the crucial issues relating to our operations, and finally to obtain your definitive decision as to whether the Government of Viet Nam is truly desires of having MSU remain in Viet Nam. It is imperative that MSU take immediate action, based either on the assumption that there will be a new contract or that our activities are to cease shortly. On the one hand, if both sides desire a contract, it is essential that accelerated negotiations among U.S.-AID-USIA-MSU be undertaken forthwith. On the other hand, if the contract is to cease,
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January 23, 1962
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It is necessary for MRC to begin at once to wind up its affairs and, because of present leave time, to have all its personnel out of Viet Nam in April and May.

There appear to be several crucial issues where an understanding and agreement between the Government of Viet Nam and MRC are prerequisites to a new contract:

1. Publications by former MRC members
2. Confidentialness of classified materials by MRC members
3. Distribution in Viet Nam of studies by MRC scholars
4. Contact of MRC personnel in Viet Nam

Each of these topics will be discussed, but since they overlap, no attempt will be made to keep each subject entirely separate.

1. Publications by former MRC members

There have been approximately two hundred MRC members in Viet Nam since the initiation of the project in 1955. It is inevitable that some few of these should have written critically—and even scathingly and dishonestly—about Viet Nam. However, the point is emphasized that the number of critical and unfair publications is relatively small. Not a one of them has been written by anyone who has held an important position (for example, Chief Advisor or Division Chief) with MRC such as Drs. Bliss, Fielder, Hagee, Howard, Huber, Jaynes, Kelley, McKee, Montgomery, Nichols, Hunter, or Haywood.

A prerequisite for a new contract, it is believed, is an understanding and tolerance by the Government of Viet Nam regarding the few unsatisfactory publications which have appeared in the past and which will undoubtedly appear in the future. 2) Former MRC members some of whom are no longer associated with Michigan State University. MRC is re-addressed as CNS over such publications as that of Dr. Wilton Taylor, but the University cannot stop them. MRC can insist that MRC withdraws not several classified information (some of which time it has ever been revealed). The University cannot prevent them from written critically of foolishly.

The Government of Viet Nam, it is hoped, will weigh the advantages of having MRC's and against the comparatively small number of bad publications which have appeared and which will be published in the future. For example, to be measured against several good publications are the benefits to Viet Nam resulting entirely or largely from MRC's work. To mention only a few, these benefits include those as follows:
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a. $32,000,000 for the building of the new National Institute of Administration

b. Recently another $600,000 for landscaping, roads, and walks at the NIA.

c. An excellently well equipped and furnished library with over 15,000 volumes, making it the finest library in Southeast Asia in the social sciences.

d. The efficiency of hundreds of civil servants enhanced by training in the United States and other countries.

e. Enabling at least 18 graduate students to study for their Ph.D. in the United States, to prepare them for the NIA’s faculty; sending of the librarians and practically all the staff of the NIA abroad for study.

f. Sponsoring successfully a project which will eventually result in the building of in-service training centers in all the provinces.

g. Audio-visual aids and other equipment to the NIA and Vietnamese government departments.

h. Aid in improving the Government’s budget system.

i. Introduction of modern teaching methods and technique such as the case method, at the NIA; stimulation of empirical research; preparation of textbooks and other teaching materials.

j. Establishment of police training; introduction of an improved identity card; improvement of travel regulations.

As already indicated, the foregoing list enumerates only a few of the material accomplishments of NBOS. Many others could be added. And besides, the material benefits there should be added the intangible benefits, which the Vice President of the NIA has declared constitute the real value of NBOS’s contributions.

Provided the Government of Viet Nam is willing to accept the inevitability of occasional critical publications by a few returning NBOS members, the University will assume the obligation of exercising the greatest care in employing personnel for Viet Nam. In the past, because of the large group here, the University was not always able to be as selective as it would have liked. In the future, the University would exert its best efforts to choose those who are genuinely interested in helping Viet Nam and who are interested in writing only scholarly, scientific studies—and not the emotional,
journalistic types of articles which two or three of our former members have written. It should be added, however, that although the University would attempt to insure such scholars (who understand that American institutions are not necessarily applicable to Viet Nam and that Viet Nam is not ready for a western-type bureaucracy), NSU would have no control over the writings of those who return from Viet Nam.

3. Problem of classified materials

NSU accepts completely the principle that returning scholars should not disclose any genuinely classified materials. The University would continue to impose on all persons going on the project that proper regard for security classifications be observed in anything they subsequently publish. The University also recognizes that the Government of Viet Nam is the proper party to determine what should be classified. However, the University would like Your Excellency's assurance the Government of Viet Nam will not adopt "blanket" classifications of entire volumes, thus precluding NSU authors from using in the United States those findings which have no security significance. In other words, whenever the Government designates certain passages or sections as classified, NSU has an obligation not to reveal the classified parts. But NSU feels that its scholars have the right to publish in the U. S. the unclassified portions of their studies. In the past there has been not a single case of disclosure of classified information by NSU members and it is believed that with a spirit of confidence and good will on both our parts, there should be no disagreement over classified materials.

3. Distribution in Viet Nam of studies by NSU members

It is believed that there is no basic disagreement between the Government of Viet Nam and NSU on the disposition made of NSU studies in Viet Nam. NSU recognizes that the Government of Viet Nam has every right to restrict or prohibit the internal distribution of all written materials produced by NSU members. In order for their studies to be of maximum value to the Government of Viet Nam, NSU professors should write frankly, reporting the facts as they find them. However, it is the Government of Viet Nam that determines which individuals and which organizations in Viet Nam shall receive copies of each study. While recognizing the right of the Government fully to determine distribution within the country, NSU would hope that in all cases where classified materials are not involved, the audience would be as large as possible. Sometimes agreements between the Government and NSU to change or modify studies in such a way that would not violate the integrity of such studies might permit a wider distribution.
4. Conduct of NSU personnel

Considering the fact that approximately two hundred NSU members have lived and worked in Viet Nam, NSU believes its members have generally conducted themselves with decorum and propriety. If there has been an occasional exception to the general rule, the exceptions should be weighed, as in the case of NSU returnees' publications, against the good of the vast majority and their significant contributions to Viet Nam. Of course, NSU will, upon request of the Government of Viet Nam, remove any staff member who behaves in a manner the Government considers improper.

Again, please permit me to emphasize to Your Excellency that it is of the utmost urgency that the University have sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements either to continue the project or to cease operations in May, 1963.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and continued esteem,

Oswald W. Foss
Chief Advisor
Our telephone conversation must have been as frustrating to you as it was to me. During the entire conversation I could understand only three of your remarks: 1) that you could understand what I was saying; 2) that Jumper's departure would be delayed for ten days; and 3) "operator...operator!" Most of the time I heard only static or unintelligible mumbles. I knew you were saying something but it was not understandable.

After a trip to the Delta area Fishel finally managed last night to see the President, who has been ill for several days. It was Wes' intention to have me come to the Palace after he introduced the subject of our contract, but the President had an important meeting during the evening and Fishel was able to have only a short conversation with him. However, it was time enough for Diem to tell Wes that he did not want a renewal of NSU's contract. The President, referring again to "dishonest" and "disloyal" publications by former NSU members, said he preferred to have a private organization such as Brookings Institution give technical assistance to the NIA.

Knowing Wes was going to see the President and that I was supposed to join in the discussion I prepared, rather hastily, a letter--of which I am enclosing a copy. I had hoped to make a revision but never had the opportunity. Wes gave the President the letter, which Diem said he would read today on the plane to Pleiku. It is not likely the letter will change his mind. My letter is subject to criticism, I fear, not only on the basis of it being a rough draft rather than a finished product but also of giving too much deference to the President's unreasonably emotional attitude. Rightly or wrongly, I was perhaps influenced by what I detected to be some stronger sentiments on the campus in favor of our continuance here. Therefore, I believe I should be as persuasive as possible without compromising our position here to present the other side of the coin.

I believe it rather safe now to assume there will be no extension of the contract and that we will terminate this summer. I am going to press for a formal decision as quickly as possible, but Wes believes it may be difficult to get one. If I do not have a formal reply by the time of Dean Seelye's visit we will probably go together to see the President.
For some time I have been reviewing our position here and giving serious consideration as to the desirability of our continuance. It is not Polly-Anna-ish to say that in spite of the fact we are leaving unfinished work it may be better if we do not renew. As Joe informed you, I have recently expressed some serious misgivings as to whether Vietnam is the proper environment in which a university should operate. Also the security situation is likely to deteriorate further. Of one thing I am completely convinced. Within a few months there will be some kind of sweeping change. I would not be surprised to see Thuan come out on top. The President has virtually no supporters in either the provinces or even at the Palace. I have been amazed at the outspoken criticisms of Brother Nhu by high-ranking officials who dared not open their mouths a few months ago. The tension is terrific and something is going to give—soon!! I hope it is bloodless.

I realise this is not too coherently written, but I wanted you to have something in writing before the mail deadline. Naturally, as soon as there are further developments I will be in touch with you.